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ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF REGRET AND ITS APPLICATIONS IN IS
DECISION MAKING
BY
Eun Hee Park
August 5, 2014

Committee Chair:

Dr. Balasubramaniam Ramesh

Major Academic Unit:

Computer information systems

Although IS studies have begun to recognize the role of emotion in decision
making, the research in this area is still in its infancy. The exploration of IS
decision making phenomena through the lens of regret can offer rich implications
to both research and practice. The presence of regret, for instance, can explain how
and why IS decision makers choose a certain option. Motivated by the gap in the
literature, the three papers in this dissertation investigate the role of regret in
decision making in IS contexts. Specifically, the three projects investigate the
following: IT real options decision in the context of RFID investment in libraries,
whistle-blowing decision in the context of violations of heath information privacy,
and process documentation decision in the context of investment in process
improvement initiatives in an IT project. The contributions and implications of the
three studies are presented further.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1 Overview
We often anticipate the feeling of regret that may result when our decisions do not yield
anticipated outcomes and wonder why we did not choose one of the other available options.
Regret is experienced as a sinking feeling or a self-blaming feeling and with thoughts about the
mistakes made. It is often accompanied by emotivational1 goals to undo the decision (Zeelenberg
et al. 1998a). Bell (1982), originally, and Loomes and Sugden (1982a) established that decision
makers anticipate regret and take that feeling into account while making decisions under
uncertainty. Bell (1982) argues that the role of emotion, specifically regret, can help explain the
anomalies that expected utility theory fails to explain. Zeelenberg et al. (1996) elaborate that
expected utility theory takes into account only the possible pain and pleasure associated with the
outcomes of a particular option under consideration. In addition, regret theory takes into account
the feelings triggered by the outcomes of the rejected options.
Zeelenberg et al. (1996) argue that regret theory can be used to explain decisions that are not
readily explained by utility theory because regret represents the emotional component of utility.
They also articulate an important assumption behind regret theory. People compare the foregone
outcomes with the foregone alternative outcomes. When they realize that the forgone alternative
outcome is better than the foregone outcome, they experience regret (Reb 2008). Further,
1

Emotivations (or emotional motives) indicates “the distinct motives or goals that accompany discrete emotions”
(Zeelenberg et al. 1998, p.223). The term is originally proposed by Roseman (1984). Action tendency indicates
“specific behavioral responses,” while emotivations indicate “desired goal states” (Zeelenberg et al. 1998, p.223).
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according to Boles and Messick (1995), social comparison with others can facilitate the
comparison of outcomes. For example, if a case tool is adopted by a software engineer, its
outcome can be evaluated in comparison with the outcome experienced by another user who
chose an alternative tool. This comparison facilitates the evaluation of performance, features, and
functions of technology.
A second critical assumption in regret theory is that regret can be anticipated. According to
Janis and Mann (1977a), “regret is anticipated when the negative consequences that might ensue
from the decision could start to materialize almost immediately after the decision is made” (p.
223). This emotional component of utility may be taken into account while decisions are made
under uncertainty. Janis and Mann argue that the regret aversion facilitates more vigilant
decision making. Since most people are regret averse, they choose options that minimize
anticipated regret (Reb 2008). Recent research in IS recognizes the role of regret in IT decision
making in a variety contexts such as measuring the success of decision support systems (Hung et
al. 2007) and IT investment decision making (Lankton and Luft 2008).
In much of the IS literature, IT decision making has been explained using cognition-based
models that focus on aspects of perception, judgment, and reasoning (such as perceived ease of
use and perceived usefulness). Beaudry and Pinsonneault (2010) suggest that cognition-based
models of decision making are not enough to explain decisions and behaviors. For instance,
emotional drivers (such as affect, emotivation) lead one’s perception to a decision or a behavior.
Therefore, they argue for the need for taking into account the role of emotion to explain
decisions and behaviors.
Although studies have begun to recognize the role of emotion in decision making (Hung et al.
2007; Lankton and Luft 2008), research in this area is still in its infancy. The exploration of IS
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decision making phenomena through the lens of regret can offer rich implications to both
research and practice. The presence of regret, for instance, can explain how and why IS decision
makers choose a certain option. Motivated by the gap in the literature, the three papers in this
dissertation investigate the role of regret in decision making in IS contexts. Specifically, the three
projects investigate the following: IT real options decision in the context of RFID investment in
libraries, whistle-blowing decision in the context of violations of heath information privacy, and
process documentation decision in the context of investment in process improvement initiatives
in an IT project. Table 1 below presents an overview of the research approach used in the three
studies.
Table 1. Overview of the Research Approach
Exploration Phase:
Study One

Application Phase:
Study Two

Application Phase:
Study Three

Research
Approach

Qualitative Research

Quantitative Research

Quantitative Research

Research
Context

IT real options decision

Whistle-blowing decision

Methodology

Multi-site Case Study

Scenario-based
Experiment

Research
Focus

 The role of regret in IT
real options decision
making
 Regret regulation
strategies that mitigate
uncertainties in IT real
options decision making

 The role of attribution
(intentionality and
stability) and seriousness
of wrongdoing in whistleblowing decision making
 The role of anticipated
regret in whistle-blowing
decision making
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Process documentation
decision
Scenario-based
Experiment
 The role of anticipated
regret in the decision to
invest in process
documentation
 The role of requirements
uncertainty and
accountability in process
documentation decision
making
 The role of the type of
project (traditional vs.
agile) in process
documentation decision

1.2 Research Objectives
The objectives of the three research projects are the following:


Study One: Explore the role of regret and regret regulation strategies in IT real options
decision making.



Study Two: Refine our understanding of psychological mechanisms underlying the
prediction of whistle-blowing decision. Specifically, evaluate the influence of
antecedents and consequences of anticipated regret in whistle-blowing decision making
in the context of violations of health information privacy.



Study Three: Evaluate the role of antecedents (such as requirements uncertainty,
accountability, and the type of project (traditional vs. agile)) and the consequences of
anticipated regret in process documentation decisions.

1.3 Study Design
1.3.1 Study One
While emotion significantly affects IT investment decision making, its role has been largely
overlooked in prior IS research. We investigate the role of a specific emotion, regret, in IT real
options decision making. We conducted a multi-site case study of the IT investment decision
making process in four public libraries that considered investing in RFID technology to examine
how regret impacts real options thinking. We develop a framework that explains how regret is
triggered by uncertainties in the environment, and how the strategies that are used to regulate
regret influence the valuation, creation, or exercise of specific real options. Our study suggests
that emotion plays a significant role in real options decision making and explains how decision
makers value, create and exercise IT real options. This perspective allows us to explore IT real
options decision making at a psychological level, complementing prior literature on real options
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thinking which primarily adopts a cognition-focused perspective. Our research also highlights
that while some regret regulation strategies may be functional, others are dysfunctional in their
influences on IT real options decision making.
1.3.1.1 Contributions
The findings from our study suggest that regret plays an important role in IT real options
decision making. The contributions to IS literature are the following: first, we developed a
framework that explains the linkages among environmental uncertainties, regret of decision
makers, regret regulating strategies, and real options decision. Second, our research provides an
initial step in the development of the much needed emotional perspective for understanding IT
real options decision making and offers opportunities for complementing prior literature on real
options thinking with the decision maker’s emotion. Finally, our framework helps understand
how real options are created at various phases of a project as a result of strategies used to
regulate experienced regret. Thus, it provides a more comprehensive understanding of how real
options are created in an IT project as the project unfolds.
1.3.2 Study Two
Potential whistle-blowers who perceived intentional or stable causes of organizational
wrongdoing often face a decision to blow the whistle or to remain silent (Gundlach et al. 2003).
They generally experience comparison-based emotions, viz. regret associated with whistleblowing or remaining silent (Edwards et al. 2009). Although it is commonly assumed that
potential whistle-blowers take anticipated regret into account in their whistle-blowing decision,
this assumption has not yet been empirically investigated.
In this study, we use attributional theory of motivation and emotion (Weiner 1980) and a
model of whistle-blowing decision (Gundlach et al. 2003) and examine the role of attributions,
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Nature of Wrongdoing

Emotion

Whistleblowing

Anticipated Regret about
Remaining Silent
H1 (+)
Intentionality of
Wrongdoing
H4 (+)

H2 (+)
H3 (+)
Stability of
Wrongdoing

Whistleblowing
Intention

H5 (+)

Control Variable

Seriousness of
Wrongdoing

Fear of Retaliation

Figure 1. Research Model for Study Two

seriousness of wrongdoing, and emotion in shaping individuals whistleblowing behavior in the
context of health information privacy violations (see Figure 1). Based on a laboratory experiment
in which intentionality of wrongdoing and stability of wrongdoing were manipulated
independently, we found that both factors played a critical role in shaping anticipated regret
about remaining silent, which in turn influences whistleblowing intentions in the context of
health information privacy violations. We also found that the effect of seriousness of wrongdoing
on whistleblowing behavior was partially mediated by anticipated regret. Implications for
research and practice are discussed.
1.3.2.1 Contributions
This study contributes to the literature in several important ways and represents the first attempt
to investigate: (1) how the nature of wrongdoing (intentionality, stability, and seriousness)
affects anticipated regret about remaining silent, and (2) how an important emotion (anticipated
regret about remaining silent) influences whistleblowing intentions. Our study also confirms the
16

direct effects of intentionality and seriousness of wrongdoing on whistleblowing intentions.
Finally, our study is the first to systematically investigate whistleblowing within the context of
health information privacy violations.
1.3.3 Study Three
IS project managers need to make decisions on the extent of process documentation
(contextualized, generalized, or no process documentation) in every IS project. This
documentation helps preserve the rationale behind critical decision made during various lifecycle
stages. While the usefulness of process documentation in significantly reducing maintenance
costs (Ramesh and Dhar 1992), facilitating communications among business partners (Biemborn
et al. 2008), and conserving an organizations’ resources (Lethbridge et al. 2003) has been
documented, the uncertainty associated with the realization of these benefits makes the decision
to invest in process documentation very challenging. Under uncertainty, decision makers
generally compare and evaluate their decision alternatives based on reference points (Kahneman
1992; Lin et al. 2006a). The psychological comparison process, called counterfactual thinking,
creates anticipated regret (Hetts et al. 2000; Lin et al. 2006a). In prior research, the role of
anticipated regret in the decision to invest in process documentation, and the role of requirements
uncertainty, accountability, and the type of project (traditional vs. agile) in shaping this
anticipated regret have not been explored.
Based on the notions of regret aversion (Zeelenberg et al. 1996; Zeelenberg and Pieters 2007)
and reference points (Kahneman 1992; Lin et al. 2006a), we investigate following research
questions: How do requirements uncertainty, accountability, and the type of project (traditional
vs. agile) influence anticipated regret about creating contextualized, generalized, or no process
documentation, and in turn, the decision to invest in this documentation? We examine this
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Control Variables

Requirements
Uncertainty

Firm Size, Age, Education

H1a (-)
H1b (+)

Anticipated Regret about
Contextualized Process
Documentation

H1c (+)

H4a (-)
H2a (-)
Anticipated Regret about
Generalized Process
Documentation

H2b (+)

Accountability

H4b (+)

Decision
to Invest

H2c (+)
H4c (+)
H3a (+)
H3b (+)

Type of Project
(Traditional vs. Agile)

Anticipated Regret about
No Process Documentation

H3c (-)

Figure 2. Research Model for Study Three
Note: H1c (*) indicates that regardless of increasing or decreasing requirements uncertainty, anticipated regret
is constantly high.

question using the research model (shown in Figure 2). An experimental study with IT project
managers are used to evaluate the hypotheses presented in Figure 2.
1.3.3.1 Contributions
This study is the first attempt to investigate the following relationships and contributes to the IS
literature in significant ways: first, how requirements uncertainty affects both anticipated regrets
about choosing contextualized process documentation and no process documentation; second,
how accountability influence anticipated regret about three types of process documentations;
third, how the type of project (traditional or agile) affects anticipated regret about three different
types of process documentations; and finally, how anticipated regret about contextualized
process documentation and no process documentation influence decision to invest in process
documentation.
18

In the following chapters, details of the three studies are presented.
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Chapter 2
A Framework for Understanding the Role of Regret in IT Real
Options Decision Making

2.1 Introduction
Emotion plays a significant role in investment decisions made under uncertainty (Lazarus 1991).
People with positive emotions such as happiness and joy tend to continue or expand their
investments through repurchase (Bagozzi et al. 1999). People with negative emotions such as
regret that result from experienced or anticipated consequences of their investments tend to plan
more vigilantly, modify their plans, or avoid making decisions (Hoelzl and Loewenstein 2005;
Zeelenberg and Pieters 2007) even though they are typically not very well aware of the influence
of their emotions on their decisions (Bazerman 2006). While emotion significantly affects
information technology (IT) real options thinking (Lankton and Luft 2008), which is a way of
valuing IT investments, its role has been largely overlooked in prior IS research.
A real option indicates “the opportunity without an obligation to take some action in the
future in response to endogenous or exogenous developments” (Tiwana et al. 2007, p. 159). In
the context of IT investments, real options correspond to the flexibility in scope, schedule and
the implementation approach used (Fichman et al. 2005, p. 75). Prior research on IT real options
decision making has primarily relied on models of cognitive processes that examine perception,
judgment, and reasoning (such as signaling effects and bounded rationality) (Tiwana et al. 2006;
Tiwana et al. 2007). Although cognition-based models significantly contribute to the
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understanding of decisions made by IT decision makers (Sengupta and Te'eni 1993), some
unique characteristics of IT investments make cognitive evaluation of IT real options difficult.
For example, some payoffs from IT projects occur indirectly through improvements in business
processes and therefore, cannot be readily evaluated. IT infrastructure investments provide long
term payoffs that are not easily measurable (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1998). Since cognition-based
models of decision making are not sufficient to fully explain decisions and behaviors, the need to
take into account the role of emotion is gaining attention in the literature (Beaudry and
Pinsonneault 2010). Since according to Jones (2003, p. 397),"cognitive and emotional
constitutions concomitantly promote and interfere with goal directed behaviors," it is important
to examine the role of emotion in goal directed behaviors such as IT investment decision making.
In the context of IT real options decision making, cognitive activities such as analyzing costs and
benefits of forgone outcomes may elicit emotions that lead to a decision or a behavior (Lankton
and Luft 2008). For example, decision makers often rely on their gut feeling or managerial
intuition, which is based on emotions (such as regret). Bazerman and Moore (2009) emphasize
the need for developing a clear understanding of how emotion influences decision making
because it can help decision makers improve the quality of their decisions. Motivated by the need
for more research in this area, the goal of our research is to understand how emotion influences
IT real options decision making.
We investigate the role of a specific emotion, namely regret. Regret is defined as “an
aversive, cognitively based emotion that people are motivated to regulate” (Zeelenberg and
Pieters 2007, p. 15). Prior research suggests that regret plays a critical role in individual’s
investment decisions in a variety of contexts such as managers’ decisions on retaining earnings
for investments (Ghosh 1993), investments in risky or safe financial investment options
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(Zeelenberg and Beattie 1997), and taking over an investment from another investor (Hoelzl and
Loewenstein 2005). Specifically, regret influences decision makers’ valuation of IT real options
(Lankton and Luft 2008). These studies suggest that regret theory is an appropriate lens to
understand the dynamics of how this emotion influences IT real options decisions made in
uncertain environments. Thus, our study is guided by the following research question: how does
regret impact IT real options decisions?
We answer this question through a multi-site case study and by drawing from the literature
on regret and real options theories. Specifically, we study real options decision making in the
context of investments in Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology in public libraries.
RFID tags transmit the identity and other data about an object using radio waves. They are
widely used in many areas such as asset tracking, manufacturing, supply chain management and
retailing. Investment in RFID in libraries is characterized by a variety of uncertainties. Further,
decisions about investments in different components of the RFID technology are often made in
stages in libraries. Therefore, this context offers multiple decision points to study IT real options
decision making under uncertainty and thus is an excellent candidate for our study.
Our study represents one of the first attempts at conceptualizing the impacts of regret in the
context of IT real options decisions. This research contributes to the literature streams on regret
and IT real options decision making. It highlights how IT investment decision makers take into
account both past experiences that resulted in experienced regret and future expectations of
anticipated regret while making their decisions. We develop a framework that explains how
regret is triggered by uncertainties in the environment, and how the strategies that are used to
regulate regret influence the valuation, creation, or exercise of specific real options. The rest of
the paper is organized as follows: First, we discuss prior literature on real options and regret
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theory. We then present the research methodology and our results in the form of a framework.
Finally, we discuss our findings and conclude with contributions to theory and practice.
2.2 Theoretical Background
2.2.1 IT Real Options
IT real options exist “whenever an IT project has flexibility about which applications and
functions to implement, and when or how to implement them” (Fichman et al. 2005, p. 75). On
the basis of flexibility available to decision makers in IT projects, prior research has identified
six types of real options (Fichman et al. 2005, p. 80): (1) growth (an initial baseline investment
unlocks a variety of potential opportunities of follow-on IT investments); (2) stage (a project can
be divided into distinct stages where pursuit of each stage is contingent on a reassessment of
costs and benefits at the time the preceding stage is completed); (3) change scale (the allocated
resources to be contracted or expanded or operational system enabled by a project can be scaled
up or down); (4) switch (switch use -- an IT asset developed for one purpose can be redeployed
to serve another purpose, or switch input -- a key foundation technology supporting a project can
be swapped out for another); (5) defer (a project can be deferred for some period without
imperiling the potential benefits); and (6) abandon (a project can be terminated midstream).
Prior research identifies two different approaches to real options decision making that are
used in practice (Lankton and Luft 2008). The first approach, broadly called formal real options
analysis (Benaroch et al. 2007; Tallon et al. 2002; van Putten and MacMillan 2004) employs
techniques that are typically used to value options in financial securities (such as the BlackScholes or binominal models (Tallon et al. 2002) (Tallon et al. 2002). While this approach may
be theoretically better, its implementation is often very complex and is subject to errors resulting
from inappropriate assumptions made by decision makers as well as the use of inappropriate
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methods for estimating model parameters (Lankton and Luft 2008, p. 204). The second approach,
broadly called ‘real options thinking,’ which is the focus of this study, is a heuristic approach
that involves “intuitive managerial judgment structured by the basic option-pricing principles”
(Lankton and Luft 2008, p. 204). While managers often gain insights from real options theory
(Fichman et al. 2005), their decision making does not correspond to the exact steps used in
option-pricing models (Benaroch et al. 2006; Tiwana et al. 2007).
Prior studies suggest that such intuitive judgment is vulnerable to potential pitfalls and is
likely to be associated with systematic biases in the valuation of real options (Fichman et al.
2005). Several attempts have been made to explain the causes of the biases by developing
models of ‘cognitive’ processes involved in the decision. Prior studies suggest that signaling
effects, framing effects, and anti-failure bias may be the possible reasons why managers value
certain option types more than others (Tiwana et al. 2006). Also, bounded rationality of decision
makers may lead to biases (Tiwana et al. 2007). While prior studies identify several cognitive
causes of systematic biases, the role of emotion which influences intuitive managerial judgment
is also gaining recognition in the literature (Hanoch 2002; Kaufman 1999; Simon 1987). Recent
research (Lankton and Luft 2008) suggests that exploring non-cognitive, emotional processes,
particularly regret, can shed new light on the fundamental mechanisms governing the valuation
of real options. Our study seeks to examine how regret impacts IT real options decisions.
2.2.2 Regret in Decision Making
Regret is an unpleasant emotion, which is associated with a sense of self-blame about the
negative outcomes caused by a certain decision or behavior. On the other hand, it is a powerful
emotion, raised with strong wishes to either undo a current situation or change a future situation
and is strongly linked to decision making (Reb 2008). Since decision makers are motivated to

24

avoid regret, their experience of regret can shape their decisions and behaviors (e.g., Bell 1982;
Lin et al. 2006b; Pornpitakpan 2010).
Regret can be classified as experienced regret and anticipated regret. Experienced regret
occurs when people think retrospectively about their past experiences and realize that the current
situation could be better if they had pursued different alternatives or actions (Kahneman and
Miller 1986). Thus, a poorly chosen alternative’s outcome compared with a forgone alternative’s
outcome triggers experienced regret (Reb 2008). In contrast, people experience anticipated
regret “when the most preferred alternative is not necessarily superior to another alternative” and
“when the negative consequences that might ensue from the decision could start to materialize
almost immediately after the decision is made” (Janis and Mann 1977b, p. 223). Anticipated
regret occurs when the situation is uncertain and a decision is important and difficult (Zeelenberg
and Pieters 2007).
The evaluative process that has been well recognized as a trigger of experienced regret and
anticipated regret is called counterfactual thinking (Epstude and Roese 2008), which is generally
expressed as conditional proposition. Counterfactual thinking involves a mental simulation on
aspects of a past event, in which people compare "the actual outcome with what the outcome
would have been, had a different choice been made" (Zeelenberg and Beattie 1997, p. 64). Here,
‘counterfactuals’ indicate thoughts about alternatives to past outcomes (Roese 2000, p. 277).
People think about the real outcome that has happened and imagine what it might otherwise have
been. Experienced regret is generated when the counterfactual outcome of a forgone alternative
is better than the actual outcome of a chosen alternative (Inman et al. 1997). On the other hand,
counterfactual thinking involves a mental simulation on aspects of a future event, in which
people engage in anticipating ‘potential counterfactuals,’ which are thoughts about alternatives to
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future outcomes (Hetts et al. 2000). Before a decision is made, people compare possible
outcomes with counterfactual alternatives (Byrne and Egan 2004; Hetts et al. 2000).
Counterfactual thinking has also been shown to influence an individual’s emotional reaction to
possible predicted outcomes by generating anticipated regret (2003; Hetts et al. 2000; Simonson
1992b).
Regret has the unique characteristics mentioned above, which make its role in decision
making interesting. Regret theorists call regret a ‘cognitive’ emotion (Zeelenberg and Pieters
2007) or ‘counterfactual’ emotion (Roese and Summerville 2005) because it is triggered by
cognitive processing of information such as counterfactual thinking. The relationship between
cognitive processing and regret has been confirmed by neuroimaging studies (Camille et al. 2004;
Coricelli et al. 2005). Camille et al (2004) who examine whether cognitive processes trigger
regret find that patients who have damaged orbitofrontal cortical do not anticipate negative
consequences of their decisions and therefore do not experience regret. The orbitofrontal cortex,
which is known to be responsible for decision making associated with calculating costs and
benefits (Bechara et al. 1994), plays a critical role in triggering the experience of regret.
Regret theory has been applied to decision making in many areas such as consumer purchase
decisions (Simonson 1992b), investment decisions (Lankton and Luft 2008; Lin et al. 2006b),
financial decision making (Ghosh 1993; Hoelzl and Loewenstein 2005; Zeelenberg and Beattie
1997), and escalation in project management (Ku 2008; Wong and Kwong 2007). For instance,
in the investment decision making context, prior studies find that the regret experienced by
investors is influenced by evaluating “what their outcomes might have been had they not
invested” as well as expected outcomes and the outcomes of “unchosen” investments that
performed the best (Lin et al. 2006b). Investigating the escalation of projects, Wong and Kwong

26

(2007) find that regret impacts escalation. Escalation of commitment is stronger with higher
anticipated regret about withdrawal than with lower anticipated regret. In IT real options decision
making, Lankton and Luft (2008) find that anticipated regret influences decision makers to value
deferral options highly but not growth options as uncertainty increases, although uncertainty
should normatively increase the values of both option types. They argue that managers’ gut
feeling that originates from regret is an important determinant of real options decisions.
Although they suggest that regret theory may explain behaviors related to IT real options
decision, this topic has received inadequate attention in the IS literature.
2.2.3 Regret Regulation Strategies
Regulation strategies are behaviors that decision makers use to manage their emotion through not
only expressive behavior but also instrumental behavior (Inman 2007). An expressive behavior
“establishes or enhances, weakens or breaks, some form of contact with some aspect of the
environment or that aims at doing so or is accessory in doing so” (Frijda 1986, p. 13) through
bodily or facial expressions. Instrumental behavior originates from action tendency, and tries to
achieve desired changes or maintain desired states with a specific purpose. Instrumental
behaviors can be generated as responses to experienced or anticipated negative outcomes or
events (Frijda 1986). A major function of instrumental behaviors is to cope with negative
emotion-eliciting events (Frijda 1986; Lazarus 1991). In regret theory, regulation related to
instrumental behaviors is an especially important notion. Since people are typically regret averse,
when they experience or anticipate regret, they seek to overcome it and regulate it through
instrumental behaviors (Janis and Mann 1977b; Pieters and Zeelenberg 2005). Zeelenberg and
Pieters (2007) suggest three types of instrumental behaviors to prevent future regret and manage
current regret: (1) decision-focused strategies are centered on the decision process and its
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outcomes (e.g., increase decision quality and justifiability); (2) alternative-focused strategies are
centered on alternatives that were not chosen (e.g., reappraise alternatives); and (3) feelingfocused strategies are centered on reducing the experience of regret feeling (e.g., deny regret).
Inman provides additional regret regulation strategies (2007, p. 22-23): reducing emotional stress
from possible current or future regret-causing feedback; encouraging the achievement of goals
and tasks; and keeping long-term integrity of personal systems (e.g., personal goals, motives).
2.2.4 Environmental Uncertainty
Environmental factors can play an important role in determining why decision makers
experience negative and positive emotions. Prior research in psychology on emotion-inducing
processes suggests that environmental factors such as thought, action and resource constraints
precede emotion (Lazarus 1991; Oatley 1992). During an emotion-inducing process, an
individual evaluates whether the experienced or anticipated consequence of an environmental
factor harms or benefits his/her goals and wellbeing (Frijda 1993; Ortony et al. 1999).
Uncertainty in the environment also has been shown to influence regret experienced by
decision makers (e.g., Bell 1982; Loomes and Sugden 1982b; Quiggin 1990; Zeelenberg and
Pieters 2004). Real options literature (Benaroch and Kauffman 1999; Tiwana et al. 2007)
highlights that “real options are more valuable under greater uncertainty based on the premise
that the managerial flexibility provided by real options is of value when there is considerable
uncertainty surrounding a project. However, uncertainty is a necessary but insufficient condition
for managers to ascribe value to real options” (Tiwana et al. 2007, p. 160). Ghosh (1993) finds
that when investment opportunities are uncertain, regret aversion leads managers to prefer
paying higher dividends rather than retaining funds for investments and to even pay dividends
using borrowed funds. Lankton and Luft (2008) find that uncertainty influences intuitive
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decisions that are based on anticipated regret. For example, high uncertainty is more likely to
lead IT decision makers to prefer deferral options to growth options.
In summary, our review of literature suggests that a detailed understanding of the
relationships among environmental uncertainty, regret, and regret regulation strategies can
provide meaningful explanations on why, how, and when people choose the course of actions
taken in a specific context (Beaudry and Pinsonneault 2010; Ortiz de Guinea and Markus 2009).
Our research seeks to develop this understanding in the context of a critical problem in the IS
domain, namely IT real options decision making.
2.3 Research Methodology
Our research seeks to develop an understanding of the role of regret in IT real options decision
making by developing a framework which is presented as a process model. Prior research on
regret mostly adopts a variance (or factor) model approach that explains the variance in the
dependent variables with independent variables. However, they do not seek to “provide evidence
of the phenomena (events, actions, and so on) that link the independent and dependent variables”
(Newman and Robey 1992, p. 250). In contrast, a process model "focuses on sequences of events
over time to explain how and why particular outcomes are reached and provides the story that
explains the degree of association between predictors and outcomes" (Newman and Robey 1992,
p. 250-251).
Since our approach is exploratory rather than confirmatory, we use a case study design (Yin
2003). While building theory from case study research is commonly done in the early stages of
research on a topic, Eisenhardt (1989) suggests it can be used to "provide freshness in
perspective to an already researched topic." The use of the case study approach is appropriate to
inductively develop a framework (Eisenhardt 1989) that explains the role played by emotion in
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IT real options decision making. A multi-site case permits a “replication logic” (Yin 2003) in
which the cases are treated as a series of independent experiments that confirm or disconfirm
emerging conceptual insights and enables us to enhance generalizability (Miles and Huberman
1994).
The selection of the study sites was driven by purposeful, theoretical sampling (Glaser and
Strauss 1967; Yin 2009) – i.e. the potential to investigate the role of regret in IT real options
decision making. We selected public libraries as the study setting because the decision making
process in public organization involves factors that make cognitive evaluation more difficult than
in private organizations. The outcome of an investment is usually not measured in economic
terms only but includes other considerations such as serving public interests whose benefits are
difficult to quantify in economic terms. As a result, the impact of emotion in decision making in
public organizations such as public libraries may be more pronounced because studies suggest
that in public organizations the decision makers are “well acquainted and emotionally involved
with the problem” (Mahler 1987). Therefore, they offered a theoretically relevant organizational
context for our study. They also offered opportunities for disconfirming our expectations that
regret plays a role in real options decision making because of the diverse nature of the outcomes
of the decisions made in the focal organizations – ranging from decision not to invest to decision
to invest in stages to full-fledged adoption of the technology (Dube and Pare 2003; Markus
1989). The selection of our case study site is consistent with the notion of “information oriented
selection” to maximize the utility of information from smaller sample (Flyvbjerg 2006). The
organizational stakeholders also had different sets of goals for the services that they sought to
offer to their clients and were operating in different settings – two libraries that served the
general public and two others educational institutions. The case study sites provided access to
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stakeholders representing multiple perspectives in the IT investment decision making process.
They had both positive and negative experiences which provided the data needed for the
development of our framework.
Libraries are increasingly investing in RFID technology because of its potential to offer
significant benefits such as improved operational efficiency and better control against theft, nonreturns, and misfiling of library assets (Boss 2004; Coyle 2005; Ting-Peng and Tanniru 2006).
However, investments in RFID technology in public libraries face uncertainties caused by the
relatively high cost, the lack of standardization or maturity of the technology infrastructure, and
the difficulties with integrating it with critical applications. Since uncertainties in the
environment are often associated with emotion-based decision making, these characteristics of
investments in RFID make it an appropriate technology to study the role of emotion in IT real
options decision making. Thus the study sites and the technology provided a sufficiently rich
context to study the role of regret in IT real options decision making. The unit of analysis in this
study is at the individual level – we investigate individual’s decision making process and the
actions taken in response to the emotions experienced or anticipated by them.
2.3.1 Data Collection
Data were collected using semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders involved in making
decisions about investing in RFID technology. They include the directors, senior managers
(public service managers and service department managers), library branch managers, IT staff,
and system analysts. Each of these individuals was responsible for the real options decisions in
some aspects of the RFID project in their respective organizations. Our study focused on
understanding the role of regret in the decisions for which each individual was responsible.
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Table 1. Respondents in the Study
VLibrary
(V)

SLibrary
(S)

TLibrary
(T)

CLibrary
(C)

Total

Director (D)

1

1

1

1

4

Senior Managers (Public
Service, Service Department,
Acquisition Managers) (M)

4

6

5

2

17

Library Branch Manager (B)

2

7

3

1

13

IT Staff / Systems Analyst (I)

2

2

2

1

7

9

16

11

5

41

Respondents

Total

Note: The capital letter indicates an acronym that is used to specify a source of a respondent in the result section.

Table 2. Regret and Regret Regulation Strategy Items (adopted from Roseman et al. (1994) &
Zeelenberg et al. (1998; 2000))
Response
Type

Motivational
Goals

Description
A broad range of feelings that includes
feeling states (moods and discrete
emotions) and feeling traits (positive and
negative affectivity)
Arrangement of ideas that result from
mental thinking process during an event
The end result toward which people are
striving or moving

Action
Tendencies

An impulse or inclination to respond with
a particular action

Actions

The result of acting or activity

Feelings

Thoughts

Response Item
 Feels a sinking feeling
 Feels that s/he should have
known better







Thinks about a mistake
Thinks about a lost opportunity
Wants to undo an event
Wants to get a second chance
Feels like kicking himself/herself
Feels like correcting his/her
mistakes
 Does something differently
 Changes the situation

Internal documents such as policy reports were used as complementary sources of secondary
data. We also observed how RFID was used in the libraries, for example, in the self check-out
process. Table 1 lists the positions of respondents and the number of interview conducted.
Since our study examines decisions that were influenced by regret rather than cognitionfocused approaches such as cost-benefit analysis, our data collection was centered on
understanding the role of regret in shaping IT real options thinking. For this purpose, we
employed the approach used by Roseman et al. (1994) and Zeelenberg et al. (1998a; 2000a).
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Table 3. Excerpt from the Interview Guide
● What were the goals of your investment decision in RFID technologies?
● What were the consequences (both positive and negative) of RFID on your customers, employees
and your organization?
● Did RFID technology bring changes in business processes to your organization?
● What kinds of uncertainties were considered in IT investment decision making?
● How did the decision making process improve managerial flexibility for the decision makers when
considering when and how to invest in different components of the RFID technology?
● What were the major organizational changes that were observed after investing in RFID?
● How did you use the data which were collected through the use of RFID?
● Describe your feelings, mental thought processes, action tendencies, desired actions, and
motivations related to RFID investment decision making (seek clarifications and details when the
respondent makes statements about a sinking feeling, regret, mistakes made, felt like kicking
him/herself, wanted to correct his/her mistakes, or get a second chance – either experienced or
anticipated)
● What kinds of strategies or actions were used to minimize the regret related to RFID investment
decision making when your decisions did not produce the expected results?
● When RFID didn’t work as planned, what back up plans did you have to maintain business
continuity?
● What were the critical events that shaped your investment decision in RFID technology?

Regret is expressed in terms of feelings, thoughts, and motivational goals. Regret regulation
strategies include action tendencies and actions (Table 2).Our data collection specifically focused
on capturing these regret and regret regulation experiences expressed by the respondents in their
description of the IT real options decision making. The interviews were audio recorded and
transcribed when feasible or detailed notes were taken. Each interviews lasted approximately 90
minutes, on average. An excerpt from our interview guide is provided in Table 3.
2.3.2 Data Analysis
Data collection was tightly interwoven with data analysis. Indeed, both activities occurred
simultaneously. As interviews were conducted, the transcripts were analyzed. Preliminary results
helped identify additional participants and helped refine the interview questions (Strauss and
Corbin 1994). The concepts identified from literature on regret theory (environmental
uncertainty, anticipated regret, experienced regret and regret regulation strategies) and IT real
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Table 4. Evidence Included in the Analysis Matrix
Type of
Evidence

Description

Environmental
Uncertainty

Uncertainties that include information
technology and IT project uncertainties.

Anticipated
Regret

Emotion occurred when decision makers
think that the most preferred alternative is not
necessarily superior to another alternative.

Experienced
Regret

Regret
Regulation
Strategies

Valuation,
Creation, or
Exercise of IT
Real Options

Emotion occurred when decision makers
think retrospectively about their past
experience and realize that the current
situation could be better if they had pursued
different alternative options or actions.
Behaviors that decision makers use to
manage experienced regret and anticipated
regret in order to achieve their goals or feel
better.
Valuation, creation, or exercise of a real
option that indicates the opportunity without
an obligation to take some action in the future
in response to endogenous or exogenous
development. In the context of IT
investments, real options correspond to the
flexibility in scope, schedule and the
implementation approach used.

Sample Quotes
"It was not clear whether the new
software could be readily integrated
with the ILS.”
“I had a sinking feeling that I may be
making the wrong decision even
though RFID was a technology of
the future as RFID might not work as
I expected.”
“The failure of the security gate was
a huge embarrassment...I felt I was
instrumental in making this major
mistake.”
"I am willing to wait rather than jump
into another technology that is not
mature yet.”

“We decided that we could switch
back to barcode when needed.”

options thinking (IT real options) served as seed concepts in our initial coding of data. Our data
analysis helped refine and/or modify these concepts and identify the relationships among them
and guide the next round of data collection. Data collection and coding were done till ‘theoretical
saturation’ was reached (Eisenhardt 1989), when additional data did not add to the concepts and
categories developed.
Transcripts of interviews constitute the primary data in this study. The data analysis focused
on identifying key concepts, categories and relationships. Our respondents were encouraged to
articulate their experiences in the form of narratives or stories. This allowed us to represent the
concepts into a temporal sequence that depicts the processes used in IT real options decision
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making. Initially, the researchers separately analyzed each case for evidence. This evidence was
summarized and entered into a matrix created for intermediate qualitative data analysis (see
Table 4 for an excerpt). The researchers also actively searched for any new concepts and
relationships that emerged. Then the results were debated and modified until the researchers
reached agreement.
The data analysis helped discover categories, relationships, and patterns in the data which
form the basis of our framework. Based on similarities and differences among the concepts,
concepts were revised and merged to better represent the underlying meaning. These concepts
were further validated and/or clarified by data from subsequent interviews. As Strauss and
Corbin (1990) suggest, theoretical relevance of concepts is indicated by their repeated presence
or notable absence when comparing incidents. No attempt has been made to statistically evaluate
the strength of a concept. As long as a concept is not contradicted by the data, it is considered to
be valid. Though the findings from such analyses are detailed and particularistic, they can be
used to develop a general explanation of the results (Eisenhardt 1989; Orlikowski 1993) through
analytic generalization (Yin 2003). Our framework was presented to key informants in the sites
and minor adjustments were made to the terminology used in the framework on the basis of their
feedback.
2.3.3 Study Sites
RFID technology is a combination of radio-frequency and microchip technologies. Information
contained on microchips in the tags that are affixed to library materials is read using radio
frequency technology. The tags can be read from a distance of up to two feet and they need not
be in the line-of-sight as required by barcode systems. RFID technology can process multiple
items simultaneously, and thereby improve operational efficiency. Components of RFID
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technology are described in Appendix A. Investment in these RFID components may be done in
multiple stages. Therefore, the study sites provided multiple decision points to understand IT real
options decision making. The study sites are briefly described below and more details are
presented in Appendix B.
The VLibrary system provides free access to information and materials to the public in a city
in the northeastern part of USA. In nine branches, RFID check-in, check-out and a security
system were implemented. In addition, seven of these branches installed self check-out counters.
However, a barcode was still used to identify a specific copy of an item. Other components such
as automatic check-in and material handling were scheduled to be adopted in future stages. The
inventory control component was implemented but it did not function as expected.
The SLibrary system is among the largest public library systems in the southern USA with
fourteen branches. It had invested over $1.2 million in RFID technology initially and had plans
to roll out the technology in the entire system after evaluating this implementation. The initial
implementation includes self check-out, check-in, inventory control and a security system.
SLibrary decided not to invest in automatic check-in, and material handling components.
The TLibrary system serves an internationally reputed public university in the USA. It serves
nearly 20,000 students, academic faculty, research staff and other professionals. While the
library evaluated the potential use of RFID technology, it decided against investing in this
technology for a variety of reasons. While TLibrary is well known for its technological
leadership, its strategic plan called for a focus on digital rather than physical collections.
Therefore, decision makers had concerns about the long-term impacts of RFID technology on the
operations of the library. In addition, they were also concerned about the lack of maturity of the
technology at the time the investment decision was made.
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The CLibrary serves a newly created university that was formed by merging smaller
educational institutions. It moved into a new campus that included a modern library building.
The library had the opportunity to include the RFID project as a part of the budget for the new
building. Further, it also had the opportunity to create physical infrastructure that would facilitate
the use of RFID technology. Since it was purchasing nearly half of its collection, it had the rare
opportunity to incorporate RFID in all aspects of its operations. It adopted most of the available
components of the RFID technology when the new library building was inaugurated.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Our Framework
We have developed a framework (shown in Figure 1) based on the analysis of data collected
from the four sites described above. Our framework includes the following events involved in IT
investment decision making that explain the role of regret in IT investment decision making:
Anticipate or Experience regret; Regulate anticipated or experienced regret; and Value, create, or
exercise IT real options. Our framework also represents the context, in which IT investment
decisions are made, namely environmental uncertainties (i.e., information technology and IT
project uncertainties) that influence anticipated or experienced regret. Sub-categories of these
concepts and the interactions among them emerged from our data. Our framework is described in
detail in this section and is briefly summarized as follows.
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Environmental Uncertainty
IT Project Uncertainty

IT Uncertainty

- Resource uncertainty
- Industry trends uncertainty

- IT novelty & turbulence
- Benefit uncertainty

Anticipate Regret
about IT Investment Decision

Experience Regret
about IT Investment Decision

Regulate Anticipated Regret

Regulate Experienced Regret

- Reach goal incrementally
- Delay decision
- Increase decision quality
- Ensure decision reversibility

- Decrease goal level
- Transfer decision responsibility
- Undo or reverse decision
- Improve decision outcome

Value, Create, or Exercise IT Real Options
- Stage
- Abandon
- Defer
- Strategic Growth
- Switch

[Legend]

: Context

: Influences

: Event

: Leads to

Figure 1. Our Framework

Anticipated regret of decision makers about their IT investment decision is influenced by
uncertainties in the environment such as IT uncertainty and IT project uncertainty. Decision
makers use regret regulation strategies to manage their anticipated regret. These strategies lead to
the valuation, creation, or exercise of IT real options. After the decision is made, decision makers
experience regret if negative outcomes of the decision are realized, They use regret regulation
strategies to manage their experienced regret which in turn lead to the valuation, creation or
exercise of IT real options.
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While our discussion on anticipated and experienced regret is presented sequentially, it
should be noted that some decision makers may experience only one type of regret while others
may experience both (i.e., only anticipated regret, only experienced regret, or both anticipated
and experienced regret). Below, we explain our framework in detail.
2.4.2 Context: Environmental Uncertainty Influencing IT Investment Decision
The environmental uncertainties that have significant impact on RFID investment decision
include IT uncertainty and IT project uncertainty.
2.4.2.1 Information technology uncertainty
In each focal organization, the characteristics of the RFID technology introduced uncertainties in
investment decision making. RFID technology which was in its early stages of development
when the focal libraries considered their investments posed uncertainties due to the novelty and
turbulence of the technology and about the benefits of the technology.
IT novelty and turbulence: The use of RFID in libraries was not widespread when the focal
libraries were making their investment decisions. A policy report from VLibrary recognized the
strategic nature of the investment in RFID: “Self-service check-out and RFID inventory control
are infant industries, and they represent an investment in the future.” It was considered a very
novel technology by the decision makers and it required investments in new hardware, software
and infrastructure. There was also uncertainty about the custom software that had to be
developed to integrate the data collected by RFID readers with existing information systems.
“[RFID technology] touches every item in [the] collection” “It was not clear to me whether the
new software could be readily integrated with the ILS [Integrated Library Systems]” (VI)2.

2

Hereafter, direct quotes from respondents are shown in italics within quotation marks. They are identified
with a two letter code representing the organization and the role of the informant (as noted in Table 1). For
example, VI represents a quote from a VLibrary (organization) IT Staff / Systems Analyst (role).
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RFID technology was believed to be still evolving at the time of its evaluation by all the
organizations. The turbulence of the technology itself was considered the most critical issue in
the investment decision, as described in the policy report of VLibrary: “The cost of this
equipment will decrease, and its availability will increase dramatically in the near future.”
TLibrary was also concerned with the issue of evolving technology and decreasing cost. “I was
told by some researchers that…more powerful and cheaper options will become available in the
market in the near future” (TM).
Benefit uncertainty: Some decision makers believed that RFID would provide relative
advantages over the barcode technology that was being used. However, they were not sure about
the extent of some of the specific benefits provided by this technology. For example, while the
director of the VLibrary was convinced about the long-term potential of the technology, she was
less certain about the immediate improvements in operations such as enhanced throughput,
increased quality of service, and improved efficiency in material handling. Similarly, in SLibrary,
“The library did not set very specific goals about critical things like the accuracy of alarms, the
reliability of the check-out process... I am not sure I could be more specific about these
performance metrics because I was not sure what the technology can deliver” (SB). The director
of the TLibrary was not sure that RFID would deliver significant value when collections were
becoming digital. “[The library was] moving in the direction of digital collections rather than
physical collections. This was part of our strategic plan. So, I feel that investments in RFID type
of technologies that are helpful with physical collections are not likely to yield benefits in the
long term” (TD).
2.4.2.2 IT Project uncertainty
Uncertainties in the project environment also influenced RFID investment decision making.
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Resource uncertainty: There were considerable uncertainties about the availability of resources
needed to invest in RFID. While the number of patrons was increasing, there were major budget
cuts in the focal organizations that could impact the RFID projects. Other resource uncertainties
such as the availability of necessary expertise in the technology also influenced the decision
making process. Many managers did not fully understand the impacts of RFID on the operations.
While they thought that RFID would improve efficiency in comparison with the use of barcodes
with its ability to simultaneously process multiple items, they didn’t recognize the significant
changes that had to be made in the systems and operating procedures for the use of this
technology. “Initially I thought that the major difference [with RFID] is… barcodes you still
have to handle every individual item, with RFID, you don’t have to handle the items, you put on
the antenna and it grabbed them all” (VB). “I am not sure whether this affects the way our daily
work performed and the functions of our librarians” (SM).
Industry trends uncertainty: Decision makers in the libraries were influenced by the uncertainty
in industry trends related to the adoption of RFID in libraries. Self-service applications were
gaining a lot of adoption in the industry. However, the potential negative consequences of RFID
also influenced the investment decision by libraries nationwide. “I know that there are some
concerns on security, privacy, and connectivity to ILS” (VI). In TLibrary, technology trends
caused concerns about investing in RFID: “We had access to technology experts who had a clear
understanding of the technology trajectory which was moving away from its current form” (TD).
2.4.3 Anticipate Regret about IT Investment Decision
Operating under uncertainty, decision makers engage in counterfactual thinking, which triggers
anticipated regret. Counterfactuals are expressed as conditional propositions that specify an
antecedent (e.g., “If I chose A…”) and an anticipated negative outcome (e.g., “I would face…”).
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Anticipated regret is expressed in the form of response types identified in Table 2. Some decision
makers explicitly expressed their emotion of regret (e.g., “I might regret…” “I have sinking
feeling…”), while others who might be reluctant to explicitly express their emotions expressed
anticipated regret in the form of ‘thoughts’ about a mistake or a lost opportunity (e.g., “I have a
feeling that I am relying too much on what the vendors say…” “the possibility of getting stuck
with obsolete technology because…”).
Technology novelty and turbulence were considered when evaluating the decision to invest
in RFID. “I was concerned that RFID technology was evolving fast, and may change
significantly even in a short period of time” (SD). Resource uncertainty was considered when the
Director of VLibrary was evaluating the costs associated with self-checkout process. “If I chose
self check-out with barcodes, it would cost much less” (VD).
Decision makers forecasted the outcomes that would result from their choices and identified
the possible outcomes for each. This process helped decision makers better understand the
consequences of each alternative. For example, potential negative outcome associated with
continuing with barcodes (rather than investing in RFID) was a concern for the decision makers.
“Our primary goal was improved customer service. We are not achieving it if we keep the status
quo” (SI).
The option to invest is also better understood when the anticipated regret for investing in
RFID is taken into consideration. RFID tags were considered quite expensive and the decision
makers were facing the possibility that the cost of the tags might decrease significantly. “I
anticipate that costs for tags could be reduced by as much as half in future years. Later when the
tags are much cheaper, I might regret that we spent so much on tags” (VI). The director of
SLibrary who expressed his anticipated regret about investing RFID stated that he had a “sinking
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feeling that I may be making the wrong decision even though RFID was a technology of the
future, as RFID might not work as I expected” (SD). A systems analyst in TLibrary anticipated
that he might regret investing RFID rather than investing at a later time because he was
concerned about “the possibility of getting stuck with obsolete technology because the
technology was changing rapidly. I didn’t want to wonder [later on] whether I should have
waited for the [RFID] technology to mature” (TI). A similar concern was expressed by the
director of CLibrary because “the technology was moving very fast and a lot of improvements
have happened in the recent years and I didn’t want to wonder later that I missed the
opportunity to invest when I had the choice” (CD).
The above examples show that emotion, specifically anticipated regret, plays a significant
role in evaluating investments. Sometimes, intense emotion causes the decision makers to focus
only on the possible negative outcome. For example, the director of TLibrary anticipated strong
regret about investment in RFID because of his focus on the potential problems with the decision.
“I was not sure about the direction in which this technology is moving. Prices may drop a lot
when this technology matures. I had a feeling that I didn’t have good answers for these questions”
(TD).
2.4.4 Regulate Anticipated Regret and Value, Create or Exercise Real Options
To regulate the anticipated regret, decision makers used several regret regulation strategies,
which had significant impact on the IT real options decisions. These strategies were expressed in
the forms of ‘action’ and ‘action tendencies’ identified in Table 2. Three libraries (VLibrary,
SLibrary and CLibrary) made the decisions to invest in RFID, but TLibrary made the decision
not to invest at the current time.
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2.4.4.1 Reach goal incrementally strategy: Stage options and Strategic growth options
After the initial decision to invest in RFID technology was made, VLibrary and SLibrary
considered the possibility of investing in various components of the RFID technology in phases.
The director and the service manager in VLibrary emphasized that their anticipated regret led to
their decision to invest in these projects incrementally. “Considering the technology, we had to
adjust the way to achieve our goal. We initiated the RFID investment even though we would not
implement all functionalities now” (VD).
This strategy led to the two libraries to create stage options. VLibrary started with two major
elements, self check-out and inventory control, while automated check-in and material handling
were considered as “future elements” (VD). Both VLibrary and SLibrary decided to
incrementally invest in self-checkout with RFID in order to mitigate the anticipated regret. “I
wish we could have transitioned all the check-out to self-checkout. I wasn’t ready to do it
because we didn’t know for sure that the technology will work perfectly as advertised. So, we
decided to transition in two stages” (SB).
The stage options were also created for introducing specific components of RFID in each
branch of the SLibrary and VLibrary. VLibrary considered investing in RFID one branch at a
time. It could be implemented at a new building first and then expanded to other branches based
on the feedback from this ‘pilot’ implementation. “We could choose a new building [to be the
first one to implement RFID]. That was our flagship. We will decide if we will implement the
same way in other branches after this one” (VD).
This strategy (“reach goal incrementally”) also impacted the creation of strategic growth
options for RFID infrastructure components in both VLibrary and SLibrary. The infrastructure
which included tagging equipment, readers, tags, and software provided the foundation for
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investing in capabilities such as self check-in and material handling. “We are looking at self
check in and even automatic material handling, in the future” (VD). “Our goal is to move to a
fully automated management of our physical collections as we are able to do with our digital
content. I want to at least have automated sorting of the checked-in material though the ideal
situation will be to have all the movement of our collections fully automated” (SD).
2.4.4.2 Delay decision strategy: Defer options
The intense regret anticipated by some decision makers caused them to postpone making the
decision. This regret was regulated by a “delay decision” strategy. The director at TLibrary
decided to delay the investment decision to a later time. His emotions led him to emphasize the
negative outcomes that may be realized and he focused on the appropriateness and the cost of
RFID without paying adequate attention to the potential benefits. “It was not clear that RFID
could deliver the results we are looking for. Our patrons are looking for capabilities for any
place any time access [digital library]... and this technology is not designed for this purpose”
(TM). “I wasn’t sure the costs will stay this high in the future” (TD).
This strategy used by the TLibrary director to mitigate anticipated regret, in effect, created
the defer option in the project. “Since we were not very certain about the trajectory that this
technology is taking, we wanted to wait until the technology is more stable before committing to
a significant investment in the technology” (TD). As a result of the defer option, the patrons of
TLibrary had to use the traditional checkout process, which sometimes caused delays at the
checkout counter. A librarian recognized this negative consequence of the decision. “We are
supposed to be a high tech institution. But we are using the age old technology and sometimes it
causes delays and frustration for our users” (TL).
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2.4.4.3 Increase decision quality: Defer options
Increasing decision quality by following well-established procedures is another strategy that was
used to mitigate anticipated regret. For example, VLibrary and SLibrary had failed to implement
the inventory control function in the first phase of the project. When evaluating this investment
the next stage, the decision makers followed a cautious approach and engaged in thorough
testing in order to increase the quality of their decision. "Our library jumped into some aspects of
the RFID system, maybe too early. I won’t do it with the wands for taking inventory control. I
want to be more deliberate and test the systems carefully before I commit to it” (SI).
Decision makers at CLibrary noticed that the requirements specified in their initial request
for proposals contained ambiguities that made it difficult for them to evaluate the responses
received from potential vendors. Therefore, a revised call for proposals was issued to ensure that
the investment decision could be made with better information. “I wanted to ensure that I had all
the relevant information about the possible costs, benefits and challenges before I could make a
decision. So, I decided to revise the request for proposals even though it would delay the start of
the project” (CD).
By following this strategy, defer options were created in the three focal organizations.
VLibrary and SLibrary decided to defer the implementation of inventory control components.
CLibrary decided to defer the project until more detailed information was available on the basis
of the revised call for proposals. “With more detailed proposals, I could make a better decision”
(CD).
2.4.4.4 Ensure decision reversibility: Switch options
To regulate anticipated regret that may result from the failure of RFID, VLibrary and SLibrary
retained the barcode system in parallel so that they could revert back to it if necessary.
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“Everything is barcoded. … in case there is a problem [with RFID]. Even though it requires a
second step in processing the materials, it is a better choice because we anticipated that RFID
might not be able to track each item” (VI). “I wanted to make sure that we could continue the
operations without much interruption even if the RFID didn’t work as anticipated. This [the
barcodes] helped us go back to our old set up if and when necessary” (SI).
This strategy provided the decision makers the ability to create switch options in self checkout and check-in components. Specifically, the three libraries prepared for switching back to the
barcode technology due to the possibility that RFID may not perform as expected. “We decided
to prepare for going back to barcode when RFID fails. To have both barcode and RFID tag,
even though it cost us more but it reduced the risks” (VI).
2.4.5 Experience Regret about IT Investment Decision
After realizing a negative outcome from a decision, decision makers engaged in counterfactual
thinking, which triggers experienced regret. The counterfactual thinking is expressed as
conditional propositions by specifying an antecedent (e.g., “If we had chosen not to replace the
security gate…”) and an alternative outcome (e.g., “we wouldn’t have this issue…”). The
experienced regret is expressed in the form of response types identified in Table 2. The ‘feelings’
of experienced regret are explicitly expressed by some of decision makers (e.g., “I regretted…”,
“I really had a sinking feeling…”), while others who might be reluctant to explicitly express
their emotions expressed experienced regret as ‘thoughts’ (e.g., “I was instrumental in making
this major mistake.”) or ‘motivational goals’ about wishing for a second chance (e.g., “I wish I
had a chance to reevaluate the decision to invest in this…”).
While RFID increased operational efficiency by eliminating repetitive tasks in some
processes, it was not considered as reliable as barcodes in some situations. “I wish I had a
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chance to reevaluate the decision to invest in this. We had major problems with the reliability of
the technology. We had several cases where the tag itself got damaged” (SM). A senior manager
at SLibrary expressed regret over the problems caused by the frequent false alarms that were
produced by the security gates. “We got a lot of flak... the false alarms at the security gate got
very sensitive. Instead of this helping us keep a check on our items, we often end up apologizing
to the customer” (SM). “If we had chosen not to replace the security gate [with RFID], we
wouldn’t have this issue [of false alarm]” (SI). The director and a manager at SLibrary further
elaborated: “It was one of the low points of my career when I had to apologize to a prominent
member of our community. The security gate malfunctioned and the alarm went off. Everyone in
the area was looking at her as if she was stealing. She didn’t take that well and I really wish we
had not put that security gate there. I really had a sinking feeling when this happened” (SM).
“The failure of the security gate was a huge embarrassment. I really wished that I had not
championed that in our meetings. I felt I was instrumental in making this major mistake” (SD).
Branch managers in both VLibrary and SLibrary regretted that the expected savings in staff
costs were not realized. RFID had the potential to free the library staff (whose salaries accounted
for the largest portion of their operating expenditures) from routine tasks so that they could
provide value added services. Based on this expectation, VLibrary had developed a new staffing
procedure that enabled self check-out in their new branches. Staff members who were freed up
from check-in/out activities were expected to be assigned to “operate computer labs and drive
up windows, do programming in meeting rooms, lead teen activities, operate homework centers
and generally invest more time with the customer during each customer visit” (VD). However,
the actual self check-out rate varied from 11% to 83% among the branches in VLibrary and the
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expected reduction in the staff time was not realized. “I haven’t seen the savings [in staff]. I am
thinking that barcodes might be a better solution considering the cost [of RFID]” (VB).
A branch manager in SLibrary also regretted his inability to implement automatic check-in
because it required major changes to the physical layout of the library and its software systems.
“There were some unexpected difficulties in the check-in process… I regretted not making it
possible to do the check-in at the desks where the patron is returning items” (SB).
Decision makers in the libraries expected to see improved security of their collections
because of the investment in RFID. However, since the system did not work as expected,
decision makers experienced regret. “Our RFID system didn’t work as well as we had
anticipated. We noticed that RFID tags had been ripped off from books and thrown into trash.
Since the trash goes through a back door which didn’t have a security gate, we didn’t know
about the loss of books for quite a while. I wish I had considered that possibility which looks
obvious after the fact” (CM).
Decision makers also experienced regret with some aspects of their decision making process.
In both VLibrary and SLibrary, decision makers experienced regret about the processes they had
used to select vendors and to evaluate the technology. For example, the director at SLibrary
explained his regret with the vendor selection process. “I wish we could choose a different
vendor. The technology and the applications are improving slowly, but we are not at the level we
expected to be at. Another major mistake on my part to assume that it was ready” (SD).
2.4.6 Regulate Experienced Regret and Value, Create or Exercise Real Options
Decision makers in the three libraries that initially invested in RFID took actions to regulate the
regret they experienced as a result. These strategies influenced the valuation, creation or exercise
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of real options. The strategies are also expressed in the forms of ‘action’ and ‘action tendencies’
identified in Table 2.
2.4.6.1 Decrease goal level: Strategic growth options and Stage options
Since the goal of reducing labor costs with the use of self check-out was not fully met, the
director at VLibrary redefined his original goal to mitigate this regret. “I don’t think it [RFID] is
a failure even though I wish we got the saving on staff [by RFID], [but] I think we are in the
transitional period. That is our hope that as we capture a higher percentage of folks using self
check, we will see a reduction of the technician positions that we need to fill or to keep” (VD).
Decreasing the goal level was also used as a strategy to regulate the regret related to the
inability to implement inventory control. The perceived criticality of inventory control was
changed to “a nice thing to have rather than critical” (SM). A service manager in VLibrary
commented that while this component was important for collections management, it was not
critical for his operations: “It would be great to have it [inventory control] but I am right now
working with the assumption that we know what is going out and what is coming in and therefore,
what we should have” (VM). Similarly, “I had anticipated this technology to fully automate
check-in and check-out, but we couldn’t do it with CDs and DVDs and with inter-library loans.
So we decided it is not necessary to use RFID for all aspects of our operations” (CM).
The decision makers concluded that the unaccomplished goals were “not necessary” so that
they could feel better about their initial decisions. They emphasized that the investments made
during early stages provided opportunities for learning from mistakes, and helped them make
better decisions during later stages. “I think the fact that we’ve implemented this over a long
period of time, we’ve been able to learn from mistakes … we learn as we go along” (VI).
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By decreasing the initial goals, the project outcomes were considered satisfactory. Therefore,
the decision makers ignored the failure of some elements and by creating strategic growth
options they could continue the investments at a later time.
This strategy also led to creating the stage options in CLibrary. CLibrary had initially
planned to have all of their acquisitions tagged with RFID tags by entering into agreements with
their suppliers. However, when one of the suppliers did not complete the task within the agreed
time frame, it delayed the availability of some critical materials. Therefore, the director of
CLibrary decided to decrease the goal level so that some of the materials could be tagged in
stages. The director explains this decision: “I wish we had taken this possibility [of delay] into
account. Some important text books were not available at the beginning of the term and this was
a serious problem. I didn’t want to face this situation again and decided to do the tagging in the
library itself in some cases. Some of the collections get tagged before entering the library and
others later” (CD).
2.4.6.2 Transfer decision responsibility: Abandon options
An action taken to mitigate experienced regret involved transferring decision responsibility.
SLibrary fired the Director of IT largely due to the bad publicity generated by the false alarms at
the security gates. “The fiasco at the security gate when an important patron was stopped in fact
created quite a storm. Someone had to take the fall for this. It turned out to be the director of IT
because he did not do due diligence while implementing the gates. He was fired mainly as a
result of this fiasco” (SM). Such a dramatic action created a negative work atmosphere in
SLibrary.
A senior manager at SLibrary was quick to point out that the development of solutions for
some of the problems faced by the library staff were solely the responsibility of the vendor.
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Therefore, she required the vendor to be directly involved in resolving the issues when new
investments were made. “We are now asking the vendor to come and install and test the system
on site and have them maintain it for a few days. It reduces a lot of stress my staff had to face
because the vendor is [now] responsible for fixing the problems” (SM).
Following this strategy, SLibrary created the abandon option to deal with situations when the
investments in some components of the technology did not perform adequately. For example,
when security gates were installed in the new wing, the library retained the option to abandon the
RFID enabled gates and bring back traditional security gates, explains a director. “I don’t want to
face the possibility of getting blamed if the gates fail again. I don’t want to wonder why I didn’t
plan for a backup” (SD).
When new software components were delivered, the vendor had to ensure that the
components were compatible with the current version of the ILS that was in use. “I made it a
requirement that they [the vendor] will have to stop implementation [of new software] if we
identified any incompatibilities”(SM). This provided the decision maker the flexibility to
abandon the investment with minimal expenditure if the technology did not work as expected.
Indeed, this option was exercised later by the decision maker when a major software component
failed to meet the requirement
2.4.6.3 Undo or reverse decision: Switch options
Since CLibrary was being set up in a new institution, it had to rely on inter-library loans when its
collections were still being built up. Most of the libraries from which books were being borrowed
used only barcode technology at that time. However, as the result of the decision to go for a fullfledged implementation of the RFID technology, CLibrary did not invest at all in barcode
scanners and related technology. The director regretted making this decision and therefore had to
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bring back the capability to scan barcodes for the collections being borrowed through interlibrary loans. Thus, he created a switch option. “I wish I had carefully evaluated the value of
having some [barcode] scanners. It would have been easier to have installed this technology at
the beginning itself. Now that we need this for the interlibrary loans, I decided to invest in this
[technology] also” (CD).
2.4.6.4 Improve decision outcome: Strategic growth options
To regulate experienced regret, the director of VLibrary initiated actions that improved decision
outcomes by better harnessing the benefits of their RFID project. VLibrary changed policies and
operational procedures so that they were are aligned well with the new technology. “How do we
make that [RFID] work? How do we change the policy? These are not technical decisions; there
are policy decisions to get the bang for the RFID buck” (VD). “With the current system we need
to take some actions. How do you structure the policies so you don’t have too many exception(s)
in self check-out?” (VM). In the beginning, when a customer returned a book, it was not
immediately marked as checked-in by the library system, and therefore the customer was unable
to borrow new materials. Therefore, VLibrary changed the procedures so that materials returned
to the library were marked immediately as checked-in. Following this strategy, decision makers
created the strategic growth option to continue investment in RFID. “That has nothing to do
with RFID, that is our policy, our procedure” (VM).
In summary, the strategies adopted to regulate the experienced regret influenced the
valuation, creation or exercise of real options. Table 5 summaries the key concepts of the
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Table 5. Summary of Key Concepts with Illustrations
Concepts
Environmental
Uncertainty

Anticipate
Regret

Stage Options
IT uncertainty
 Technology novelty
and turbulence

Defer Options
IT uncertainty
 Technology novelty
and turbulence
 Benefit uncertainty

DM anticipated regret
about RFID
investment decision
because of high
technology
uncertainty.

DM anticipated regret
about RFID
investment decision
because of technology
novelty and high
benefit uncertainty.

To address AR, DM
engaged in ‘reach
goal incrementally’
strategy.

DM experienced
regret about RFID
investment decision
because of the
system malfunction.
To address AR, DM
engaged in ‘ensure
decision reversibility’
strategy and kept
the barcodes
systems.

To address ER, DM
engaged in ‘decrease goal
level’ strategy. DM ignored
the failure of some
elements and escalated the
project to future investment.

The regulation
strategy led DM to
value a stage option
highly and created a
stage option.

The regulation
strategy led DM to
value a defer option
highly and created a
defer option.

Abandon Options
IT uncertainty
 Technology novelty
and turbulence

DM anticipated
regret about RFID
investment decision
because of high
technology
turbulence.

To address AR, DM
engaged in ‘delay
decision’ strategy.

Regulate
Experienced
Regret (ER)

Value, Create
or Exercise IT
Real options

Switch Options
IT uncertainty
 Technology
novelty and
turbulence

DM experienced regret
about RFID investment
decision after an initial goal
was not reached.

Experience
Regret

Regulate
Anticipated
Regret (AR)

Strategic Growth Options
IT uncertainty
 Technology novelty and
turbulence
IT project uncertainty
 Resource uncertainty

The regulation strategy led
DM to value a strategic
growth option highly and
created a strategic growth
option.

Note: DM = IT Real Option Decision Maker; ER = Experienced Regret; AR = Anticipated Regret
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The regulation
strategy led DM to
value a switch
option highly and
created a switch
option.

To address ER, DM
engaged in ‘transfer
decision
responsibility’
strategy and made
future problems the
vendor’s
responsibility.
The regulation
strategy led DM to
value an abandon
option highly and
created an abandon
option.

framework with illustrations on how each real option resulted from strategies used to regulate
anticipated and experienced regret.
2.5 Discussion
The findings from our study suggest that regret plays an important role in IT real options
decision making. In this section we discuss the implications of our research in the following
areas: the link between real options thinking and regret, the role of regret regulation strategies in
valuing, creating, and exercising real options, and the functional and dysfunctional impact of
those strategies.
2.5.1 The Link between Real Options Thinking and Regret
Literature on real options (e.g., Adner & Levinthal, 2004; Luehrman, 1998; McGrath, 1997,
1999; Trigeorgis, 1996) has largely emphasized the value of flexibility that is provided by real
options. For example, when the uncertainty involved in investment decisions increases, creating
options to postpone investments and waiting for signals about the outcomes of the investments
have been shown to be effective strategies. In contrast to the flexibility provided by options,
prior studies also have revealed the value of early commitment in competitive situations (Dixit &
Pindyck, 1994; Ghemawat, 1991; Gilbert & Lieberman, 1987; Lieberman, 1987a). Irreversible
commitments are aimed at gaining strategic advantages by discouraging rivals from investing. In
situations that are both imperfectly competitive and uncertain, the value of flexibility must be
traded off against the value of early commitment.
The context of investment in RFID in public libraries is characterized by high uncertainty
mainly because of the novelty and turbulence of the technology, and low competition because of
the nature of industry. Prior research suggests that in such situations, the flexibility provided by
real options is usually preferred over early commitment. However, our data shows both
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alignment to as well as differences from this preference. For example, when faced with the high
uncertainty involved in RFID implementation in their libraries, SLibrary and VLibrary created
stage options to implement the technology in phases. However, our study also reveals that early
commitment may be preferred over flexibility even in this context as a result of the actions taken
to regulate emotions. For example, in CLibrary, the high anticipated regret associated with the
loss of the opportunity to invest in an advanced technology led decision makers to commit early
to investing in the technology in spite of the high uncertainties involved in the technology. This
suggests that regret may play an important role in the pursuit of flexibility or early commitment.
Decision makers take actions to mitigate the intense negative emotion and these actions may not
align with the rationale evaluation of the alternatives which would have led to the creation of
different types of options as observed in prior studies.
2.5.2 Regret Regulation Strategies and Real Options
Prior studies suggest that, under high uncertainty, ‘anticipated regret’ of decision makers
influences the valuation of the defer options and the strategic growth options in IT investment
decisions (Lankton and Luft 2008). Our study extends this finding by suggesting that not only
anticipated regret but also experienced regret influences real options decision making.
Anticipated regret is a function of predicted decision outcomes and it influences the valuation of
real options before an IT project starts. Experienced regret is a function of decision outcomes
actually realized in an IT project. Our findings show that experienced regret motivates decision
makers to take correctives actions and it also influences the subsequent valuation and creation of
real options.
Prior research on decision making process indicates that cognitive feedback improves
decision makers’ performance (Sengupta and Abdel-Hamid 1993; Sengupta and Te'eni 1993).
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Fichman et al. (2005), who take a cognition-focused real options approach, suggest that decision
makers’ capability for evaluating the degree of uncertainty and potential gains or losses plays an
important role in the valuation of options (see Table 6). They emphasize rational (or cognitive)
capability of real options decision makers.
However, high uncertainty is one of the major challenges in the cognitive valuation of
options. In highly uncertain situations, decision makers have difficulty in valuing the expected
payoffs and predicting the impact of the evolution of technologies on their investments (e.g.,
Fichman 2004; Fichman et al. 2005). Our study suggests that regret shapes the decision making
process when the cognition-focused real options approach has a limitation due to high
uncertainties. Our study provides a nuanced understanding on IT real option decision making,
rather than providing competing explanations to the cognition-focused approach.
Salient regret regulation strategies that influence real options thinking are compared with the
cognitive factors identified in Table 6. Decision makers with either experienced or anticipated
regret become regret averse. They are motivated to minimize their regret and take vigilant
actions through regret regulation strategies, which, in turn, lead to the valuation, creation and
exercise of specific real options that may not align well with the cognition-focused approach.
For example, a major challenge to the valuation of strategic growth options comes from the
high uncertainties associated with net payoffs and longer time frames. Organizations have been
observed to create this option so that future investment decisions can be made when the relative
value of follow-on investments becomes clearer (Fichman et al. 2005). Our findings suggest that
the strategies used to minimize experienced regret about a prior decision influence the creation of
this option. This strategy sometimes does not totally align with the cognitive evaluation of the
payoffs of the follow-on investments. In some of the focal organizations, decision makers
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Table 6. Cognition Focused and Regret Focused Approaches to Value, Create, or Exercise Real Options
Options
Stage

Abandon

Defer

Strategic
Growth

Switch

Cognition Focused
Approach
Major factors

Regret Focused Approach
Experienced Regret Regulation Strategy
Anticipated Regret Regulation Strategy

 Risks due to technical
complexity (Benaroch et al.
2006).
 Reassessment of costs and
benefits (Fichman et al. 2005).
 Client acceptance risk,
organizational adoption risk,
etc (Benaroch et al. 2006).
 As actual costs and benefits
become clearer (Fichman et al.
2005).
 A project is evaluated as a
losing proposition (Fichman et
al. 2005).
 Immediate forgone cash flows
are small (Benaroch et al.
2006).

Decrease goal level
 A goal in a first stage was failed to achieve.
 Experienced regret about RFID investment
decision leads decision makers to decrease goal
level at a decision in a subsequent stage.
Transfer decision responsibility
 System malfunction happened.
 Experienced regret about RFID investment
decision leads decision makers to the creation of
an option to abandon implementation of the
software system at the vendor’s cost.

 Relative value of follow-on
investments becomes clearer.
Only investments with positive
pay offs are pursued further
(Fichman et al. 2005).

Decrease goal level
 Initial goal was not reached.
 Experienced regret about RFID investment
decision leads decision makers to decrease the
goal to continue future investment.
Improve decision outcome
 Initial goal was not reached.
 Experienced regret about RFID investment
decision leads decision makers to take actions to
improve the outcome of RFID system and continue
future investment.
Undo or reverse decision
 Technology malfunction happened.
 Experienced regret about RFID security gate leads
decision makers to switch back to original gate
system.

 An organization switches to an
alternative technology when a
chosen technology proves less
robust (Fichman et al. 2005).
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Reach goal incrementally
 Under high RFID technology uncertainty
 Anticipated regret about investing RFID decision
leads decision makers to incrementally investing
in RFID.

Delay decision
 Under high RFID technology uncertainty
 Anticipated regret about investing RFID decision
leads the director to emphasizing the potential
negative outcomes and focusing on considering
the cost of RFID, rather than the benefits.
Increase decision quality
 Under high project uncertainty
 Anticipated regret about ambiguous process
leads decision makers to requesting a revised
call for proposals.
Reach goal incrementally
 Under high technology uncertainty
 Anticipate regret about no RFID investment
decision leads decision makers to making an
initial baseline investment in technology
infrastructure while prospecting potential
opportunities of subsequent IT investments.

Ensure decision reversibility
 Under high technology uncertainty
 Anticipate regret about RFID investment
decision leads decision makers to keeping the
old barcodes system in parallel so that they
could revert back to it.

decreased the level of their initial goals about RFID to reduce experienced regret. In VLibrary,
for instance, the inventory control feature was redefined as a “nice to have” and noncritical
feature. Thus, the emotion they experienced influenced the decision makers in the creation of
strategic growth options.
Under high uncertainty, anticipated regret about a particular decision plays a role in valuing
and creating real options. For instance, prior literature suggests that switch options are valuable
when either the relative value of switching is more obvious or switching to a rival technology is
more profitable (Fichman et al. 2005). Our findings suggest intense emotion such as regret
influences the creation of the switch option. Decision makers who have high anticipated regret
about IT investment decision because of the potential malfunctioning of the technology and the
interruption it may cause to business activities seek to ensure that their investment decision is
reversible to reduce their regret. This leads them to the creation of switch options.
Our data also shows that regret and cognitive assessment closely intertwine and shape the
real options thinking. In exercising stage options, decision makers assessed the costs and benefits
in each stage and engaged in counterfactual thinking, which in turn triggered experienced regret
about the decisions made. To regulate regret, decision makers decreased the goal level in
subsequent phases and created stage options.
2.5.3 Functional, Dysfunctional Regret Regulation Strategies and Biases
Our results suggest that regret regulation strategies may be either functional or dysfunctional in
influencing the valuation, creation, and exercise of real options (see Table 7). Based on prior
literature (David et al. 2004; Mikulincer 1998), we define functional strategies as adaptive
behaviors and dysfunctional strategies as maladaptive behaviors adopted by decision makers in
order to regulate regret.
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Table 7. Functional, Dysfunctional Regret Regulation Strategies and Biases
Influence

Example Regret Regulation Strategy Observed
To minimize anticipated regret about RFID
investment decision, decision makers chose
‘reach goal incrementally.’

Learning

Learning lessons from
negative outcomes and
engaging in activities to
improve future decision
outcomes.

After a failure to implement inventory control
wands in the first phase, to minimize anticipated
regret about RFID investment decision, decision
makers chose ‘increase decision quality’ and
‘increase decision outcome’ by following wellestablished procedures to evaluate new
inventory control wands.

Dysfunctional
Defensive

Taking maladaptive
actions to minimize
regret, thus increasing
adverse consequences.

To minimize experienced regret about security
gate installment decision and its failure, decision
makers transferred decision responsibility to the
director of IT and fired him. This created
negative work atmosphere.

Misprediction

Tendency to overvalue/
undervalue a target
event or phenomenon
due to anticipation of
regret.

Omission

Tendency to prefer
harm caused by
omissions over equal or
lesser harm caused by
acts due to anticipation
of regret.

Biases

Dysfunctional

Functional

Functional
Defensive

Description
Taking adaptive actions
to minimize regret, thus
reducing adverse
consequences.

Anticipated regret about RFID investment
decision due to leaving behind in high
technology usage and losing an opportunity to
offer innovative services led decision makers to
overvaluing the benefits of RFID technology in
CLibrary and abandoned the alternative
technology without careful evaluation.
Decision makers had greater anticipated regret
about high cost of RFID technology and possible
negative outcomes from immature technology
without considering the benefits of technology at
TLibrary. They created a defer option and had
waited until the technology becomes stable. But
until today, they have been not utilizing the
benefits of advanced technology and thus lost
opportunity to offer innovative services.

We classify the regret regulation strategies into defensive strategies and learning strategies
based on their focus on emotion or on decision outcome. (1) Defensive strategies focus on
reducing discomfort and increasing comfort (Frijda 1986). They can be either functional or
dysfunctional. Functional defensive strategies use adaptive actions to minimize regret, thus
reducing adverse consequences, while dysfunctional defensive strategies use maladaptive actions
to minimize regret, thus increasing adverse consequences. (2) Learning strategies focus on
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learning lessons from negative outcomes to improve future decision outcomes. Therefore, we
classify learning as a functional strategy. In addition to dysfunctional defensive strategies, our
study identifies two types of bias influencing regret regulation strategies: misprediction and
omission (see Table 7). We discuss below the implications of these strategies and the biases.
Functional regret regulation strategies: Although regret is a negative emotion and people try to
avoid it, regret regulation strategies offer some functional advantages in real options decision.
Functional defensive behaviors that reduce discomfort and thus reduce adverse consequences
(Frijda 1986) were observed in our study. Experienced regret regulation strategies such as
‘decrease goal level’ and ‘undo or reverse decision’ and anticipated regret regulation strategies
such as ‘reach goal incrementally’ and ‘ensure decision reversibility’ are examples of functional
defensive strategies.
Although all regret regulation strategies intrinsically aim at reducing regret and discomfort,
some (such as ‘increase decision quality’ and ‘improve decision outcome’) offer the advantage
of learning and improvement. A prior study (Inman 2007) suggests that decision makers who
experience regret decouple their feeling of self-blame from the opportunity to learn and thus
make a better decision in the future. Our findings additionally show that the functional advantage
occurs at regulating experienced or anticipated regret about real options decision procedures and
outcomes. For example, decision makers engage in more vigilant actions to improve their
decision procedures. They use well established evaluation and testing procedures and hence try
to collect all the relevant information to improve the quality of decisions and thereby decision
outcomes.
Dysfunctional regret regulation strategies: Some dysfunctional regret regulation strategies were
also observed in our study. First, to minimize regret and reduce discomfort, decision makers
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were involved in dysfunctional defensive behaviors (such as ‘transfer decision responsibility’
and ‘delay decision’) that resulted in increasing adverse consequences. For instance, decision
makers in TLibrary delayed their decision due to intense anticipated regret. This behavior may
cause the decision makers to create defer options inappropriately. Prior studies on real options
identify this phenomenon as one of the pitfalls of defer options (Fichman et al. 2005). Our study
offers an explanation on why this dysfunctional behavior occurs. While anticipating regret,
decision makers tend to focus only on regulating their emotions and as a result, their cognitive
assessment is hindered. They become regret aversive and in turn decision aversive. Delay
decision strategy allays decision makers’ regret in the short term. But in the long run, it can raise
higher levels of regret about losing the opportunity to use an advanced technology at the
appropriate time.
Biases influencing regret regulation strategies: Prior studies on real options thinking suggest that
decision makers are prone to engage in cognitive biases such as bounded rationality bias and
anti-failure bias in the valuation and creation of real options (e.g., Tiwana et al. 2006; Tiwana et
al. 2007). These studies identify cognitive biases and explain the reasons for their occurrence at
the cognitive level. In contrast, our study contributes to the real options literature by identifying
potential biases caused by regret and explains the reasons for their occurrence at the emotional
level. Our study suggests that in some instances, decision makers use regret regulation strategies
that are biased towards action, such as ‘misprediction’ and ‘omission.’ This, in turn, leads to the
valuation, creation, and/or exercising of real options that produce negative consequences.
Gilbert et al. (2004a) suggest that the misprediction occurs when the anticipation of regret
leads decision makers to overvalue or undervalue a target event or phenomenon (e.g., overpay
for technology products, overvalue an ability). In the adoption of RFID technology, Otondo et al.
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(2009) point out that overvaluing RFID’s potential might compromise the decision makers’
capability to arrive at an appropriate decision. Tiwana et al.’s study (2007) identifies ‘bounded
rationality bias’ in satisfying information search practices. Decision makers terminate
“information search without further considering a broader realm of available information to form
a judgment…satisfiers are ready to act as soon as they have enough information to satisfy their
self-imposed informational requirements” (Tiwana et al. 2007, p. 161). Our findings suggest that
anticipated or experienced regret influence the identification of the satisfying point. For example,
decision makers consumed by high anticipated regret about being left behind in high technology
use tend to overvalue the capability of the technology and terminate their information search
without considering all available information. Thus, they are vulnerable to the misprediction bias.
Furthermore, Tiwana et al. (2006) suggest that decision makers tend to undervalue specific types
of real options (e.g., abandon option and stage option) because they misperceive the potential
value of such options. Our findings suggest that such misperception occurs because of high
anticipated regret about the negative consequences from the most adverse circumstances. Here,
the experience of high regret blinds decision makers from properly perceiving the value of
available options.
Prior real options literature (Fichman et al. 2005; Tiwana et al. 2006) also suggests that
decision makers are susceptible to anti-failure bias, in which decision makers perceive project
abandonment as a failure and find it difficult to terminate a project. Our findings provide
additional insights on this phenomenon by investigating it at the emotional level. Regret theorists
suggest that to regulate regret, people tend to involve in omission bias that results from “a greater
willingness to accept harms from omission, the default, than harms from action” (Baron and
Ritov 2004, p. 75). Our study suggests that the decision makers’ difficulty in terminating a
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project may result from high anticipated regret from potential negative consequences. In the case
of TLibrary, the high anticipated regret about the appropriateness of the RFID technology for
their current situation led decision makers to prefer the continued use of the old barcode system
and accepting the inefficiencies associated with it. To avoid regret, the decision makers engage
in dysfunctional behaviors, in which they prefer to accept current losses resulting from the
continued use of a technology, than the loss that may be incurred by terminating the use of this
technology.
2.6 Conclusion
2.6.1 Implications for Research
Prior studies have established the significance of regret in decision making in a variety of
contexts (e.g., Inman 2007; Zeelenberg and Pieters 2007). However, there has been limited
research on understanding how regret influences the IT real options decision making. We address
this limitation by developing a framework that explains the linkages among environmental
uncertainties, regret of decision makers, regret regulating strategies, and real options decisions.
Further, much of the literature on regret has used laboratory experiments to study the antecedents
of regret (e.g., Hung et al. 2007; McConnell et al. 2000; Pieters and Zeelenberg 2005) or its
effects on an intention/behavior (Larrick and Boles 1995; Reb 2008; Simonson 1992b;
Zeelenberg and Beattie 1997). In contrast, our framework which is based on a study of an
organizational decision making environment highlights how these elements influence each other,
and over time. Below, we elaborate on these contributions.
A primary assumption in the literature on real options thinking is that the valuation of real
options is based on a rational evaluation of costs and benefits (Fichman et al. 2005; Ondrus et al.
2005). Our study suggests that emotion also plays a role in real options decision making. The
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emotional perspective helps explain how decision makers value real options and how they create
and exercise them (Lankton and Luft 2008). This perspective allows us to explore human
behaviors at a psychological level and provides us with more fundamental understanding of real
options thinking. Thus, our research provides an initial step in the development of the much
needed emotional perspective for understanding IT real options decision making and offers
opportunities for complementing prior literature on real options thinking with the decision
maker’s emotion.
While much of the prior literature on real options thinking has focused on the creation of real
options at the beginning of an IT project, our framework helps understand how real options are
created at various phases of a project as a result of strategies used to regulate experienced regret.
Thus, it provides a more comprehensive understanding of how real options are created in an IT
project as the project unfolds.
2.6.2 Implications for Practice
Our study provides implications for IT real options decision makers.
Recognize regret and its role on decision making: Decision makers should understand that
people are often reluctant to express their negative emotions such as regret and as a result, they
fail to recognize the impact of regret on their decision making process. Regret is often expressed
indirectly in terms of a decision maker experiencing a sinking feeling, having thoughts about a
lost opportunity, and expressing motivational goals such as looking for a second chance.
Decision makers should learn to recognize the presence of regret and be sensitive to the impact
of regret on their decision processing process.
Choose appropriate regret regulation strategy: Decision makers should understand that some
regret regulation strategies are functional in that they improve the quality of the decision process
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as well as outcomes, while others are dysfunctional in that they lead to adverse consequences or
biased decisions. Decision makers should seek to maximize the use of functional strategies and
avoid the use of dysfunctional strategies to regulate regret.
Create appropriate real options: Decision makers should understand how regret regulation
strategies influence the valuation, creation, and exercise of IT real options. Since the use of
‘learning strategies’ may significantly improve the quality of their future decisions by taking
more vigilant actions and creating appropriate real options, decision makers should actively seek
to use such strategies.
2.6.3 Limitations and Future Work
Our findings may be particularistic to the four organizations studied. Generalizability of the
findings is undermined by the particular context of the study such as organizational culture,
individual characteristics, and the nature of RFID technology. This suggests the need for further
empirical studies to examine the validity of the findings in different contexts. While we
employed a research design commonly used in the field of psychology for studying emotion
retrospectively, it is also conceivable that our approach might create recall bias in the informants.
However, this risk is mitigated by including multiple respondents from each organization and the
availability of public documents about the decision made which provide the ability to triangulate
the findings.
Our study offers the necessary groundwork for further quantitative research operationalizing
the elements in our framework and examining the relationships among them. While the study
focused on the role of regret in the decisions made by individual decision makers, investigations
of factors such as organizational culture, norms, influence of group members on individuals that
influence emotions may offer further nuanced insights into the phenomenon.
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Appendix 2A: Components of RFID Technology in Libraries
Check-in: Automatic check-in offers RFID-enabled book drops (in-wall, or standalone
outdoor/indoor book returns). The software automatically checks in returned items in the
library’s database and reactivates the security tag with options of printing a receipt and/or hold
notices. Semi-automated check-in by library staff is also possible.
Self Check-out: A self-check workstation allows patrons to checkout without the need for the
involvement of staff.
Security Gate: Detection of any unchecked library items leaving the premises and alarm
systems to alert staff to unchecked items being carried out of the premises.
Material Sorting/handling: A multiple-bin sorter provides advanced customized sorting of
materials into a number of carts/bins, each dedicated to a specific location within the library. It
saves physical labor and reduces staff injuries.
Automated Conveyor: With an automated conveyor system, items are sent to their appropriate
locations.
Inventory Control: The collection can be scanned for inventory taking or search for specific
items that are missing, lost, on hold, transit, claimed returned, and mis-shelved. These functions
can be carried more efficiently and accurately without the need to physically pull items from
shelves.
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Appendix 2B: Study Sites
VLibrary: It supports the educational and leisure needs of citizens with a system of eight area
libraries, a central library, a bookmobile, a public law library, a municipal reference library and
special services for the blind and visually handicapped. It has a collection of more than 1 million
items which includes books, audio books, music CDs, video tapes, DVDs, books in large type,
magazines and newspapers. The library subscribes to numerous online reference sources, ebooks
and audiobook services. The library has been building new branches and renovating buildings in
recent years. Initially, the RFID project was a part of the capital expenditure for new library
branches. Later VLibrary adopted RFID in almost all its branches.
SLibrary: Nearly 6.5 million visitors check out approximately 7 million items each year. It
subscribes to over 150 online reference databases and holds over 1 million items in its collection.
SLibrary also viewed the opening of new branches as an opportunity to invest in RFID
technology. The RFID project was initially implemented in a new branch and then rolled out to
the entire system.
TLibrary: It houses over 2.5 million books, periodicals and nearly 30,000 e-journals and
publications and 1800 electronic government documents. It supports over 20 million virtual
visits, over 2.6 million search and nearly 1.2 million full-text articles retrieved from its electronic
databases. Also, over 2 million items are accessed from its digital collections.
CLibrary: It supports the students and faculty of a four year university. It houses about 65000
books and periodicals and subscriptions to extensive electronic resources in the form of
databases. Further, the relatively smaller size of this academic library also influenced the
decision to invest in RFID technology. It adopted most of the available components of the RFID
technology when the new library building was inaugurated.
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Chapter 3
Violations of Health Information Privacy: The Role of Attributions,
Seriousness of Wrongdoing, and Anticipated Regret in
Whistleblowing

3.1 Introduction
With the passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which included $20
billion to modernize health information technology systems, the digitization of patients’ medical
records has accelerated in the United States. This growth, however, brings increased concerns
regarding protection of sensitive health information, which can now be more readily shared.
According to Angst and Agarwal (2009, p. 348), there is “substantial and growing evidence that
privacy and security of health information is a matter of paramount importance to individuals.”
This is consistent with the fact that people are more sensitive about their personal health
information than other types of information about their lives (Smith et al. 2011). A survey
conducted by the California HealthCare Foundation found that 67 percent respondents felt
“somewhat” or “very concerned” about health information privacy (Bishop et al. 2005).
While the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) was enacted,
in part, to protect patients’ health information privacy, there have been several instances in which
violations of health information privacy have occurred.
In 2007, a front desk office coordinator at The Cleveland Clinic was convicted for selling
Medicare and other demographic information about approximately 1,130 patients leading
to $7 million in fraudulent Medicare claims (Wood 2008). [Example A]
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In 2012, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tennessee agreed to pay $1.5 million to settle potential
violations after 57 unencrypted computer hard drives containing sensitive medical
information on more than 1 million patients had been stolen (Mueller 2012). [Example B]
In 2013, a jury awarded a woman $1.44 million after finding that a Walgreens pharmacist
had violated her privacy by looking up and sharing the woman’s prescription history
(Evans 2013). [Example C]
In 2013, the Shasta Regional Medical Center (“SRMC”) of California paid a sum of
$275,000 for intentionally disclosing protected health information to the media. The U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services Office of Civil Rights Director Leon Rodriguez
stated, “When senior level executives intentionally and repeatedly violate HIPAA by
disclosing identifiable patient information, OCR will respond quickly and decisively to
stop such behavior” (Sylvia and Freedman 2013). [Example D]
Based on the above examples, violations of health information privacy can result from
intentional (example A, C, and D) or unintentional (example B) actions. Further, as OCR
Director Rodriguez suggests, such violations can be attributed either to stable causes (i.e.,
behaviors that are not likely to change as evidenced by repeated violations) or unstable (i.e.,
behaviors that are likely to change) causes.
Violations of health information privacy such as the ones mentioned above are likely to
become more common with the growing digitization of health records and the concomitant
sharing of sensitive health information within the health care system (Angst and Agarwal 2009).
In the past, patients medical records were stored in physical form, there was less sharing of
health information, and therefore less potential for accidental leakage or intentionally
inappropriate use of sensitive information. Based on the above examples, it is clear that
legislation such as HIPAA, no matter how well intentioned, cannot prevent inappropriate use of
sensitive health information. Therefore, from a patient (or consumer) protection perspective, it is
important to understand how such violations can be made visible to decision makers with the
authority to take appropriate corrective action. When organizational wrongdoing occurs,
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whistleblowing by an insider remains perhaps the most effective way of bringing such violations
to light.
The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH) of
2009 is likely to bring an increase in whistleblowing cases because it contains provisions for the
sharing of civil monetary penalties with individuals harmed by an improper breach of protected
health information (Liles 2012). Thus, if a patient’s medical records are inappropriately accessed
or used, the harmed patient may be eligible to receive a portion of the penalties collected by the
government.
While there has been prior research on whistleblowing in a variety of different contexts, the
question of how violations of health information privacy affect whistleblowing intentions
remains uninvestigated. This represents an important theoretical gap that we seek to address with
the present study. One problem that can arise in this context is when organizations that have
access to protected health information (e.g., electronic medical records) decide to use that
information in ways that violate health information privacy (e.g., using protected health
information for marketing purposes). When such violations occur, it is of theoretical importance
to understand what motivates or inhibits individuals from engaging in whistleblowing. In this
research study, we draw on attribution theory (e.g., Weiner 1985; Weiner 1992) and the concept
of anticipated regret (e.g., Inman 2007; Simonson 1992a; Zeelenberg and Pieters 2007) to
understand whistleblowing intentions in the context of health information privacy violations.
Specifically, we address the following research questions:
(1) To what extent do certain attributions (i.e., intentionality and stability) and perceived
seriousness of wrongdoing affect anticipated regret about remaining silent?
(2) To what extent does anticipated regret about remaining silent influence whistleblowing
intentions?
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In the sections that follow, we briefly review relevant literature, introduce our research model
and hypotheses, describe our research methodology, and present our analysis and results. We
conclude with discussion and implications for research and practice.
3.2 Background
In this section, we review relevant aspects of attribution theory and anticipated regret that we
draw upon in our theorizing.
3.2.1 Attributional Theory
The basic premise of attribution theory is that people seek to know why particular events have
occurred and as they engage in this sensemaking process, they make certain causal attributions
depending on how they construe or evaluate the events. The theory has been extensively used to
examine the causal attributions that people make, and the consequences of these causal
attributions (e.g., Heider 1958; Kelley 1973; Weiner 1980). According to the theory, when
individuals make causal attributions, this can evoke specific emotional responses, which in turn,
influence behavior (Weiner 1985; Weiner 1986).
Attribution theory identifies a number of causal dimensions including stability and
intentionality that can drive emotional responses. Stability refers to “the degree to which the
cause is anticipated to change over time. Stable causes do not change, whereas unstable causes
do” (Martinko 1995, p. 9-10). Intentionality refers to the extent one perceives that the cause for
an outcome occurred purposively (i.e., intentionally) or not (i.e., unintentionally) (Weiner 1985).
Since our dependent variable of interest is whistleblowing intentions, we focus on these two
causal dimensions because they are both relevant to the assignment of responsibility for acts of
wrongdoing (Weiner 1985). While attributions can lead to a variety of emotional responses, in
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this study, we focus on anticipated regret because it has been suggested that it can influence
whistleblowing intentions (Edwards et al. 2009), but this has not be empirically tested.
3.2.2 Anticipated Regret
Anticipated regret is a comparison-based emotion (Zeelenberg and Pieters 2007). When decision
makers realize that the current situation is uncertain and a decision is important, they anticipate
future regret (Zeelenberg and Pieters 2007). Also “when the most preferred alternative is not
necessarily superior to another alternative” (Janis and Mann 1977a, p. 223), they experience
anticipated regret. Anticipated regret makes decision makers consider future anticipatory
outcomes, and because people are regret averse they may choose a regret avoiding alternative
(e.g., Reb 2008; Wong and Kwong 2007; Zeelenberg and Pieters 2007).
Edwards, Ashkanasy, and Gardner (2009) propose a conceptual framework in which they
suggest that whistleblowing decisions can be affected by basic emotions such as fear as well as
anticipated emotions such as anticipated regret. In a laboratory experiment, Fredin (2008; 2011)
examined various predictors of regret including moral intensity of the situation, type of
wrongdoing, and salience of regret associated with either whistleblowing action or inaction.
Subjects were presented with a hypothetical scenario in which a person in the scenario had to
decide whether or not to engage in whistleblowing. For the salience of regret manipulation,
subjects were cued to anticipate either how much regret the individual in the scenario would feel
if they took action (i.e., engaged in whistleblowing) or not (i.e., chose to remain silent). Fredin
found that individuals made greater regret predictions in situations involving high moral intensity
and when they were cued to consider possible regret effects associated with remaining silent.
While Fredin’s (Fredin 2011, p. 423) study suggests that “individuals will recognize the
emotional costs that could come with a decision to sit back and do nothing about a wrongdoing

73

Figure 1. Research model
Nature of Wrongdoing

Emotion

Whistleblowing

Anticipated Regret about
Remaining Silent
H1 (+)
Intentionality of
Wrongdoing
H4 (+)

H2 (+)
H3 (+)
Stability of
Wrongdoing

Whistleblowing
Intention

H5 (+)

Control Variable

Seriousness of
Wrongdoing

Fear of Retaliation

situation,” it does not provide an empirical test of the relationship between anticipated regret
about remaining silent and an individual’s whistleblowing intentions.
3.3 Research Model and Hypotheses
Drawing on attribution theory and anticipated regret, we developed the research model and
hypotheses shown in Figure 1 and discussed in detail below. As indicated in Figure 1, our
hypotheses map to only a subset of the paths in the model. This is because two of the paths
(intentionality of wrongdoing  whistleblowing intention, and seriousness of wrongdoing 
whistleblowing intention) have already been established in prior research. Specifically Gundlach
et al. (2008) showed that perceived intentionality of the wrongdoing has a positive influence on
whistleblowing intentions. Furthermore, prior studies have provided strong evidence that
seriousness of wrongdoing has a positive impact on the whistleblowing intentions (e.g. Miceli
and Near 1985; Miceli and Near 1992; Miethe 1999).
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3.3.1 Nature of Wrongdoing to Emotion of Anticipated Regret
We theorize that the nature of the wrongdoing (i.e., intentionality of wrongdoing, stability of
wrongdoing, and seriousness of wrongdoing) influences anticipated regret about remaining silent.
When organizations act intentionally to perform “a morally blameworthy act” (Hamilton and
Sanders 1999, p. 222), they may visit serious harm to customers and society (Miceli et al. 2008).
When potential whistleblowers realize that an organization intentionally engages in wrongdoing,
this can elicit strong emotion (Weiner 1992). In empirical studies, Betancourt and Blair (1992)
found a positive relationship between intentionality of a violent action and anger and empathetic
emotions. Gundlach, Martinko, and Douglas (2008) also reported a positive relationship between
intentionality and anger. However, the relationship between intentionality of wrongdoing and
anticipated regret about remaining silent has not been examined in prior empirical studies.
When potential whistleblowers perceive intentionality associated with organizational
wrongdoing, they can, in theory, experience greater anticipated regret about remaining silent
(Edwards et al. 2009), although this has yet to be shown empirically. Intentionality of
wrongdoing may give rise to anticipated regret about remaining silent for two reasons. First,
when the decision is perceived to be an important one due to the intentionality that is present,
individuals are more apt to experience anticipated regret about remaining silent (e.g., Reb 2008;
Zeelenberg and Pieters 2007). Second, the presence of intentionality can make individuals
question their initially preferred alternative of remaining silent, such that they are apt to
experience anticipated regret. Specifically, potential whistleblowers who perceive organizational
wrongdoing as intentional may begin to wonder whether their decision to remain silent will lead
to a situation in which harm will come to individuals due to their unwillingness to take a stand.
On the basis of the above arguments, we state the following hypothesis:
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H1: Intentionality associated with an organization’s wrongdoing will be positively related
to anticipated regret about remaining silent.

In addition to intentionality of wrongdoing, we theorize that stability of wrongdoing can also
trigger anticipated regret about remaining silent. The relationship between causal stability and
expectancy has been supported by attribution theorists (e.g., Folkes 1984; Weiner 1992). The
basic premise is that if conditions are expected to remain the same, then the current outcomes
can be expected to occur again. Weiner (1985) points out that stability of a cause can not only
influence expectancy, but can also evoke emotional responses.
In the context of whistleblowing, it has been theorized that when employees perceive
organizational wrongdoing as resulting from stable (as opposed to unstable) causes, they are
more likely to experience emotional responses such as anger, resentment, and fear (Gundlach et
al. 2003). In an empirical paper, Gundlach, Martinko, and Douglas (2003) found a positive
relationship between stability and anger. However, the relationship between stability and other
emotions such as anticipated regret about remaining silent has not been tested. We theorize that
stability of wrongdoing may give rise to anticipated regret about remaining silent for two reasons.
First, when the decision is perceived to be an important one due to the stability of wrongdoing
and the accompanying threat that such wrongdoing will recur, individuals are more apt to
experience anticipated regret about remaining silent. Second, the presence of stability can make
individuals question their initially preferred alternative of remaining silent, such that they are apt
to experience anticipated regret. Specifically, potential whistleblowers who perceive
organizational wrongdoing as stable may begin to wonder whether their decision to remain silent
will lead to a situation in which harm will come to individuals due to their unwillingness to take
a stand. On the basis of the above arguments, we state the following hypothesis:
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H2: Stability associated with an organization’s wrongdoing will be positively related to
anticipated regret about remaining silent.

Finally, we theorize that seriousness of wrongdoing also influences anticipated regret about
remaining silent. Seriousness of wrongdoing refers to the extent to which a particular wrongful
activity may bring harm by resulting in substantial consequences to those who are affected
(Gundlach 2003; Miceli and Near 1985; Miceli and Near 1992). Prior studies have shown that
serious wrongdoing is more likely to cause potential whistleblowers to perceive that the
wrongdoing needs to be reported (Lowry et al. 2013) and to feel some personal responsibility to
report the wrongdoing (Lowry et al. 2013; Park and Keil 2009). Observing serious wrongdoing is
also likely to elicit strong emotional responses (Edwards et al. 2009). We argue that seriousness
of wrongdoing affects anticipated regret about remaining silent for two reasons. First, when
wrongdoing is perceived to be serious, individuals will attach greater importance to their
decision of whether or not to engage in whistleblowing (Lowry et al. 2013). For this reason,
individuals are more apt to experience anticipated regret about remaining silent. Second, when
the wrongdoing is perceived to be serious, this can make individuals question their initially
preferred alternative of remaining silent, such that they are apt to experience anticipated regret.
Specifically, potential whistleblowers who perceive serious wrongdoing to have occurred will
wonder whether remaining silent will bring harm to others. On the basis of the above arguments,
we state the following hypothesis:
H3: Perceived seriousness of wrongdoing will be positively related to anticipated regret
about remaining silent.
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3.3.2 Emotion of Anticipated Regret to Whistleblowing Intention
Prior research has shown that people are regret aversive (i.e., they are motivated to avoid or
minimize regret). Thus, individuals will experience anticipated regret as they weigh various
alternative courses of action, and will tend to choose an alternative that minimizes regret (Reb
2008). Potential whistleblowers must weigh blowing the whistle against the alternative of
remaining silent and anticipated regret may influence how they weigh these alternatives.
Specifically, the anticipated regret associated with remaining silent may make individuals more
inclined to engage in whistleblowing. This line of reasoning is consistent with conceptual
arguments made by Edwards, Ashkanasy, and Gardner (2009) regarding the relationship between
anticipated regret and the whistleblowing decision. In particular, they argue that when potential
whistleblowers experience strong anticipated regret about remaining silent, there is a high
likelihood that they will blow the whistle. Nevertheless, the relationship between anticipated
regret about remaining silent and whistleblowing intentions has not been investigated empirically.
In this study, we address this gap by proposing and testing the following hypothesis:
H4: Anticipated regret about remaining silent will be positively related to whistleblowing
intention.

3.3.3 Stability of Wrongdoing to Whistleblowing Intention
While prior work (Gundlach 2003) examines the impact of the stability of wrongdoing on
judgments of responsibility and the emotion of anger, the direct effect of stability of wrongdoing
on whistleblowing intention has not, to our knowledge, been previously tested. Martinko and
Zellars (1998) suggest that stable attributions are likely to influence behavior intentions.
Building on this work, Gundlach, Douglas, and Martinko (2003, p. 111) theorize that “when
organizational members attribute wrongdoing acts to stable causes, they will be more motivated
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to change the behavior of wrongdoers by blowing the whistle.” We seek to test this empirically
by investigating the relationship between stability of wrongdoing and whistleblowing intention.
We therefore hypothesize:
H5: Stability associated with an organization’s wrongdoing will be positively related to
whistleblowing intention.

3.3.4 Fear of Retaliation as a Control Variable
Fear is a powerful emotion that can result in risk avoidance (Lerner and Keltner 2001; Ohman
1993). In the context of whistleblowing decision, prior research has shown that there is a
negative relationship between fear of retaliation and whistleblowing behavior. Near and Miceli
(1986), for example, consider retaliation to be a significant factor in shaping whistleblowing
intentions, acknowledging that there is often a significant power relationship between
management (i.e., superiors) and potential whistleblowers (i.e., subordinates). Based on a large
scale survey of managers, Keenan (1990) found a negative relationship between fear of
retaliation and perceptions regarding the adequacy of a company’s encouragement for
whistleblowing. This suggests that fear of retaliation may create a climate of silence in an
organization (Jain et al. 2011), thereby reducing employees’ willingness to engage in
whistleblowing. Based on a qualitative study involving 40 interviews with employees across a
wide array of industries, Milliken, Morrison, and Hewlin (2003) reported that fear of retaliation
is one of the reasons why employees do not speak up against wrongdoing in the workplace. For
these reasons, we include fear of retaliation as a control variable in our study.
3.4 Research Methodology
Whistleblowing is a low-base rate behavior that is not easily studied in organizational contexts.
Therefore, a laboratory experiment was selected as the methodology of choice for this study. By
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examining the phenomenon in an experimental setting, we were able to achieve high internal
validity. While we used student subjects for our experiment, our goal was to generalize to theory
and not to a particular population (Compeau et al. 2012). Experiments have been widely used in
the study of whistleblowing (e.g., Gundlach et al. 2008; Smith et al. 2001). In this study, we
conducted a 2x2 factorial design experiment, in which intentionality of wrongdoing and stability
of wrongdoing were manipulated independently, allowing us to study the effect of these
variables on whistleblowing intentions.
3.4.1 Scenario and Procedure
Subjects were told that the experiment was about business decision-making, that participation
was voluntary, and that their responses would remain anonymous. After completing an informed
consent form, subjects were asked to read a short scenario (shown in APPENDIX 3A) involving
a pharmaceutical company that is illegally mining the electronic health records of its customers,
in violation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). Subjects were
asked to play the role of an employee who has observed the company’s actions and must decide
whether or not to engage in whistleblowing.
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the four treatment conditions in which the level of
stability of wrongdoing was portrayed as being either high or low and the level of intentionality
of wrongdoing was portrayed as being either high or low. In the high-intentionality condition,
subjects were informed that the management of their company is aware of the violation of
HIPAA, but is intentionally mining the health records for marketing purposes. In the lowintentionality condition, subjects were informed that the management is new to the company and
is unaware that the mining of health records is a violation of HIPAA. Similarly, in the highstability of wrongdoing condition, subjects were informed that the company has been repeatedly
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engaged in wrongdoing. In the low-stability of wrongdoing condition, subjects were told that the
violation of HIPAA has occurred for the first time.
After reading the scenario, subjects responded to a set of questions that included
manipulation checks as well as measures associated with seriousness of wrongdoing, anticipated
regret about remaining silent, whistleblowing intention, and fear of retaliation (as a control
variable).
3.4.2 Subjects
Data were gathered from 143 business school students enrolled in information systems courses at
a large urban university in the southeastern United States. Seven subjects were dropped from the
study either because they failed one or more manipulation checks (4 subjects) or because they
were outliers (3 subjects), leaving us with 136 usable responses. The mean age of these subjects
was 24 years and the mean work experience was 4 years. Sixty-five percent of the subjects were
male and thirty-five percent were female.
While the use of student subjects in research on decision-making often raises concerns about
external validity (e.g., Peterson 2001; Sears 1986), our goal was not to generalize to a particular
population, but rather to theory. Thus, we argue that use of student subjects in our context is
appropriate. Moreover, since our subjects had an average of four years of work experience and
had also completed coursework that incorporated conceptual knowledge about ethics and
business decision-making, we contend that they had the requisite knowledge to understand
whistleblowing situations.
3.4.3 Constructs and Measures
APPENDIX 3B provides a list of our constructs, along with measurement items and informing
sources. All of our construct measures were adapted from existing measures and including
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multiple measurement items with the exception of anticipated regret about remaining silent,
which was assessed using single item measure. The anticipated regret measure was adapted from
Wong and Kwong (2007) and is consistent with the measure used by Connolly et al. (1997) and
Zeelenberg et al. (1998b). The anticipated regret measure explicitly asks subjects to imagine a
possible anticipated negative outcome (Simonson 1992a; Wong and Kwong 2007).
Seriousness of wrongdoing was assessed using two indicators that were adapted from Miceli
and Near (1985; 1992) and Gundlach (2003). The whistleblowing intention, which was our
dependent variable of interest, was also assessed using two indicators that were adapted from
Miceli and Near (1984; 1985) and Gundlach (2003). Our control variable, fear of retaliation, was
assessed using three measurement items that were adapted from Keenan (1990).
3.5 Analysis and Results
3.5.1 Manipulation Checks
We conducted manipulation checks to examine whether our intentionality of wrongdoing and
stability of wrongdoing manipulations were working as expected. The manipulation check for
intentionality of wrongdoing asked subjects to indicate whether they perceived the company’s
HIPAA violation to be intentional (1 = strongly disagree (i.e., low level of intentionality); 7 =
strongly agree (i.e., high level of intentionality)). The manipulation check for stability of
wrongdoing asked subjects to indicate whether they perceived that the company’s illegal mining
of health records was part of an ongoing pattern of behavior (1 = strongly disagree (i.e., low level
of stability); 7 = strongly agree (i.e., high level of stability)). In a one-way ANOVA, the mean
difference between the low level of intentionality of wrongdoing (M = 3.14, SD = 1.83) and the
high level of intentionality of wrongdoing (M = 6.00, SD = 1.48) was statistically significant and
in the expected direction, F(1,136) = 102.11, p < .001, 2p = .43. In a separate one-way ANOVA,
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the mean difference between the low level of stability of wrongdoing (M = 3.37, SD = 2.08) and
the high level of stability of wrongdoing (M = 5.57, SD = 1.41) was statistically significant and
in the expected direction, F(1,136) = 53.36, p < .001, 2p = .28. The ANOVA results indicate
that the manipulations were effective.
3.5.2 PLS Analyses
We analyzed the data with partial least squares (PLS) using SmartPLS 2.0 (Ringle et al. 2005).
PLS is a structural equation modeling technique that uses a component-based approach to
estimation. Many prior studies on whistleblowing have adopted PLS analysis (e.g., Keil et al.
2004; Smith et al. 2001; Thompson et al. 2007).
3.5.2.1 Measurement Model Assessment
All of our constructs were modeled reflectively and our measurement model assessment involved
an examination of convergent and discriminant validity.
Convergent Validity. To evaluate convergent validity, we began by examining standardized
loadings. When the standardized loadings are greater than 0.707 this indicates that the shared
variance between each item and its associated construct exceed the error variance (Chin 1998).
As shown in Table 1, all the loadings were 0.846 or higher, thus exceeding this threshold. Based
on these results, all of the indicators were retained for subsequent analysis.
Next, we evaluated the internal consistency for each block of measures by examining
Cronbach’s alpha, composite reliability, and average variance extracted (AVE). Values for
Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability that exceed 0.70 provide adequate evidence of
reliability (Bearden et al. 1993; Yi and Davis 2003). As shown in Table 1, all of the constructs in
the measurement model exhibited
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.75 or higher, and composite reliability of 0.88 or higher. Fornell and

83

Construct

Table 1. Item loadings and construct reliability
Standardized Cronbach’s Composite
Item
Loading
Alpha
Reliability

Average Variance
Extracted

Seriousness of
Wrongdoing

Swrong1
Swrong2

0.921
0.924

0.826

0.920

0.852

Whistleblowing
Intention

Dc1
Dc2

0.851
0.928

0.746

0.884

0.793

Fear1
Fear2
Fear3

0.957
0.942
0.846

0.909

0.940

0.839

Fear of Retaliation

Larcker (1981) suggest examining the average variance extracted (AVE) as another indicator of
construct validity. AVE measures the variance that a latent construct captures from its indicators
relative to the variance due to measurement error (Chin 1998). The accepted threshold for AVE
is 0.5 or higher, indicating that 50% or more variance of the indicators is accounted for (Chin
1998). As seen in Table 1, all AVEs are above this threshold. Based on the above analyses, we
concluded that our measures exhibit adequate construct reliability.
Discriminant Validity. In order to establish discriminant validity, we first examined each
indicator’s loading on its own construct as well as its cross loading on all other constructs. Table
2 shows that for each set of measures, the loadings on the intended construct are higher than the
cross loadings on other constructs.
Next, we compared the AVE for each construct with the shared variance between all possible
pairs of constructs (Fornell and Larcker 1981). Table 3 shows that AVE for each construct is
higher than the squared correlation between the construct pairs, indicating that more variance is
shared between the latent construct and its block of indicators than with another construct
representing a different block of indicators. Together, the above analyses provide adequate
evidence of discriminant validity.
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Table 2. Loadings and cross-loadings for the measurement model
Construct
Item
1
2
3
1. Seriousness of
Wrongdoing
2. Anticipated
Regret about
Remaining Silent
3. Whistleblowing
Intention
4. Fear of
Retaliation

Construct

4

Swrong1

0.921

0.305

0.326

0.065

Swrong2

0.924

0.378

0.251

0.036

RegS

0.370

1.000

0.402

-0.162

Dc1

0.217

0.316

0.851

-0.067

Dc2

0.324

0.391

0.928

-0.090

Fear1

0.045

-0.175

-0.109

0.957

Fear2

0.057

-0.116

-0.067

0.942

Fear3

0.055

-0.142

-0.051

0.846

Table 3. AVEs versus squares of correlations between constructs
Seriousness of
Whistleblowing
Fear of
AVE
Wrongdoing
Intention
Retaliation

Seriousness of
Wrongdoing

0.852

-

Whistleblowing
Intention

0.793

0.559

-

Fear of
Retaliation

0.839

0.234

0.300

-

3.5.2.2. Structural Model Assessment
Having established that our measurement model was adequate and that the threat of common
method bias was low, we then examined the structural model (Figure 2). To evaluate the
explanatory power of the structural model, we assessed R2 for each dependent variable. The
model accounts for 22.6 percent of the variance in whistleblowing intention and 17.7 percent of
the variance in anticipated regret about remaining silent. These R2 values are sufficiently high to
make the interpretation of path coefficients meaningful.
We used bootstrapping (1000 resamples) to obtain t values for our path coefficients (see
Figure 2). Due to the directional nature of the hypotheses, one-tailed tests were used.
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Figure 2. Structural model

Nature of Wrongdoing

Emotion

Whistleblowing

R2 =.177

Intentionality of
Wrongdoing

H1: .151
(T=1.877)*

H2: .128
(T=1.771)*

Anticipated Regret about
Remaining Silent

.172
(T=2.120)*

H4: .271
(T=3.130)**

H5: .072
(NS)

Stability of
Wrongdoing
H3: .349
(T=4.546)***

R2 =.226
Whistleblowing
Intention

.195
(T=2.170)*

-.090
(NS)
Control Variable

Seriousness of
Wrongdoing

Fear of Retaliation

Note: NS: path coefficient is not significant; Solid lines indicate significant paths and dashed lines indicate nonsignificant paths.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001 (one-tailed test)

Intentionality of wrongdoing had a positive effect on anticipated regret about remaining silent (
= 0.151, p < 0.05), thus supporting H1. Stability of wrongdoing had a positive effect on
anticipated regret about remaining silent ( = 0.128, p < 0.05), thus supporting H2.
Seriousness of wrongdoing also had a significant positive effect on anticipated regret about
remaining silent ( = 0.349, p < 0.001), thus supporting H3. Anticipated regret about remaining
silent had a significant positive effect on whistleblowing intention ( = 0.271, p < 0.01), thus
supporting H4. The direct effect of stability of wrongdoing on whistleblowing intention, however,
was not found to be statistically significant. Thus, H5 was not supported.
We also examined the direct effects of intentionality of wrongdoing and seriousness of
wrongdoing on whistleblowing intentions. These paths were part of our structural model but
were not stated as formal hypotheses because they represented relationships that had already
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been shown to be significant in prior research. Nevertheless, for replication purposes, we tested
them as part of our PLS analysis. Consistent with prior research, the direct effects of
intentionality of wrongdoing and seriousness of wrongdoing on whistleblowing intentions were
found to be significant ( = 0.172, p < 0.05 and  = 0.195, p < 0.05 respectively).
3.5.3 Common Method Bias Assessment
We conducted Harmon’s single-factor test to assess the threat of common method bias
(Podsakoff and Organ 1986). The results indicated that no single factor accounts for the bulk of
the covariance. We also conducted Lindell and Whitney’s (2001) marker variable test that uses a
theoretically unrelated construct to adjust the correlations among the principal constructs in the
model. Common method bias can be detected when there is any high correlation of the marker
variable with the principal constructs. We separately conducted the marker variable test with two
variables that are not included in the model (age and full-time professional experience). We have
little or no theoretical basis that suggests a relationship with the principal constructs. The average
correlation among age and the principal constructs was r = 0.059 (T value = 0.960) and the
average correlation among full-time professional experience and the principal constructs was r =
0.033 (T value = 0.860), leading to the conclusion that common method bias is not an issue in
this study.
3.5.4 Post Hoc Analysis
Given the structure of our model and the results obtained above, we conducted a post hoc
analysis to probe whether anticipated regret about remaining silent played a significant mediating
role in our model. We used a bootstrapping approach to test whether the indirect effects were
statistically significant (MacKinnon et al. 2004; Shrout and Bolger 2002). Specifically, we used
the parameter estimates from the bootstrapping procedure in PLS, and calculated the standard
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error of each indirect effect. We then calculated a t-statistic for each indirect effect by dividing
its magnitude by the standard error. The bootstrapping approach is advantageous because it does
not impose any distributional assumptions regarding the indirect effect. No significant indirect
effects were found for intentionality of wrongdoing (t = 1.416, n.s.) or stability of wrongdoing (t
= 1.535, n.s.). However, the indirect effect of seriousness of wrongdoing was found to be
significant (t = 2.509, p < 0.01), indicating that anticipated regret about remaining silent partially
mediates the relationship between this variable and whistleblowing intention.
Overall, four hypothesized paths (H1-H4) in our research model were found to be significant,
and the results indicate that the model is capable of explaining a substantial amount of the
variance in what is generally acknowledged to be a complex decision context (i.e.,
whistleblowing). Next, we discuss the limitations of our research, and its implications.
3.6 Discussion and Implication
We draw upon attribution theory and regret theory to investigate how the nature of wrongdoing
(i.e., intentionality of wrongdoing, stability of wrongdoing, and seriousness of wrongdoing) and
emotion (i.e., anticipated regret about remaining silent and fear of retaliation) influence
whistleblowing intentions in the context of health information privacy violations. This study
contributes to the literature in several important ways and represents the first attempt to
investigate: (1) how the nature of wrongdoing (intentionality, stability, and seriousness) affects
anticipated regret about remaining silent, and (2) how an important emotion (anticipated regret
about remaining silent) influences whistleblowing intentions. Our study also confirms the direct
effects of intentionality and seriousness of wrongdoing on whistleblowing intentions. Finally,
our study is the first to systematically investigate whistleblowing within the context of health
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information privacy violations. Before discussing implications for research and practice, we
briefly turn to its limitations.
3.6.1 Limitations
By necessity, we limited our study to a small number of variables and it is likely that other
factors may also influence emotions and whistleblowing intentions. In addition, we used a
single-item measure for anticipated regret about remaining silent, which limits our ability to
assess reliability. A single-item measure for anticipated regret has, however, been commonly
used in prior research (e.g., Lankton and Luft 2008; Wong and Kwong 2007; Zeelenberg et al.
1998b).
There are instances in which it is appropriate to employ a single-item measure such as when
constructs are unambiguous and sufficiently narrow (Wanous et al. 1997). Furthermore,
Bergkvist and Rossiter (Bergkvist and Rossiter 2007) suggest that the use of a single-item
measure can be justified when the object of the construct is “concrete singular.” By this, they
mean that the construct consists of one concrete object that is “easily and uniformly imagined”
by the respondent (Bergkvist and Rossiter 2007). For our study, we constructed a single item
measure of anticipated regret about remaining silent that was tailored to fit our scenario and
which outlined a concrete outcome that would be associated with a decision to remain silent, thus
leaving little room for imagination on the part of the respondent. Thus, we believe that the use of
a single-item measure was appropriate in this instance.
Finally, some may question the use of student subjects for experiments such as ours on the
grounds that students are either a poor substitute for managers (because they lack knowledge and
experience that might be gained in the working world) or because the rich context of an
organizational environment cannot be reproduced within the confines of a narrow laboratory
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experiment. From this point of view, our methodological choice of an experiment represents a
limitation. However, as we have noted earlier, our intention was not to generalize to a particular
population, but rather to theory, and to do this by testing causal relationships. Thus, we argue
that use of student subjects in our context is appropriate. In testing causal relationships between
variables, internal validity is of paramount concern, and controlled experiments are known to be
strong in this area. As noted by Cook and Campbell (1979, p. 84), “jeopardizing internal validity
for the sake of increasing external validity usually entails a minimal gain for a considerable loss.”
Experimental designs should therefore be evaluated on whether they are likely to increase our
understanding of human behavior, not on whether they mimic organizational settings (Dobbins et
al. 1988).
3.6.2 Implications for Research
This study has important implications for research. First, we show that the perceived nature of
wrongdoing influences anticipated regret about remaining silent. Our study is unique in that it
provides empirical evidence linking attributions with anticipated regret about remaining silent.
Consistent with regret theory (e.g., Reb 2008; Zeelenberg and Pieters 2007), our results suggest
that when a decision is perceived to be an important one due to attributions of intentionality or
stability, individuals are more likely to experience anticipated regret about remaining silent.
Further, the results we obtained are consistent with Gundlach et al.’s (2003) theorizing that
organizational wrongdoing that is attributed to intentional or stable causes is more likely to lead
to emotional reactions. .
Second, our findings indicate that when seriousness of wrongdoing is high, individuals are
more likely to experience anticipated regret about remaining silent. Our study is the first to
provide empirical evidence for this relationship. These results suggest that in decision contexts
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that involve serious wrongdoing, individuals will attach greater importance to whistleblowing
decisions.
Third, our study is the first to empirically establish the linkage between anticipated regret
about remaining silent and whistleblowing intention. Consistent with regret theory (e.g., Inman
2007; Reb 2008; Zeelenberg and Pieters 2007), the results of our study show that anticipated
regret about remaining silent leads to greater whistleblowing intentions. These findings are also
consistent with Edwards et al.’s (2009) theorizing on the relationship between anticipated regret
and whistleblowing.
Fourth, we found a significant direct relationship between intentionality of wrongdoing and
whistleblowing intention, thus providing replication of the findings reported by (Gundlach et al.
2008). We also found a significant direct relationship between seriousness of wrongdoing and
whistleblowing intention which was also consistent with previously reported findings in this area
(e.g. Miceli and Near 1985; Miceli and Near 1992; Miethe 1999).
Fifth, we did not find a significant relationship between stability of wrongdoing and
whistleblowing intention, as we had hypothesized. Instead of having a direct effect on
whistleblowing intention, stability may influence individuals' expectancies which, in turn,
influence decision-making (Carroll and Payne 1977). Weiner (1992) further argues that stability
can not only affect expectancy, but can also cause an emotional reaction which, in turn, can
affect decision-making. In the context of the present study, this may explain why we did not
observe a direct effect of stability on whistleblowing intention.
Finally, we conducted post hoc analysis to explore the mediating role of anticipated regret
about remaining silent. We found that this variable plays a significant mediating role in the
relationship between seriousness of wrongdoing and whistleblowing intention. While prior
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studies (e.g. Miceli and Near 1985; Miceli and Near 1992; Miethe 1999) have suggested that
seriousness of wrongdoing has a positive impact on whistleblowing intention, the underlying
mechanism associated for this has been largely neglected. Our results demonstrate that
anticipated regret about remaining silent is an important intervening variable that partially
mediates the influence of seriousness of wrongdoing on whistleblowing intention.
3.6.3 Implications for Practice
This study offers important implications for practice as well. First, as concerns about violations
of health information privacy increase, it is critical to understand how individuals perceive the
nature of such violations and what motivates their whistleblowing intentions. Our findings
clearly show that when violations of health information privacy are attributed to intentional or
stable causes, or involve serious wrongdoing, individuals experience greater feelings of
anticipated regret about remaining silent. When such an emotional response is triggered,
whistleblowing intentions are strengthened. From an ethical standpoint, organizations that handle
protected health information have a duty to ensure that it is used only for the intended and
allowable uses for which it was collected. Exercising care in this area is the single most
important thing that managers can do to prevent problems from erupting that would lead to
whistleblowing. Having said that, we expect that there will be violations of health information
privacy that occur from time to time.
From a practical standpoint, our results suggest that when such health information privacy
breaches occur, managers should be particularly careful to explain the situation to employees so
as to prevent them from making incorrect assumptions about the intentionality or stability of the
company’s actions. Managers should also be aware that once emotions such as anticipated regret
are triggered, it is much more likely that employees will engage in whistleblowing.
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In our study, our measures for whistleblowing intentions tapped into individuals’ willingness
to report perceived wrongdoing to external parties (i.e., outside the organization). From a
practical standpoint, managers should do everything possible to instill a culture that promotes
internal whistleblowing so that when breaches of health information privacy occur, they can be
dealt with internally. When employees report perceived organizational wrongdoing to external
parties this can destroy an organization’s public image and erode the trust that others have for an
organization and its products. By creating a climate that encourages employees to report
organizational wrongdoing through secure internal communication channels and further by
signaling to employees that appropriate action will be taken to correct any reported wrongdoing,
an organization can properly resolve the issue reported internally and minimize reputational
threats. Further, by creating an organizational climate that is conducive rather than hostile toward
whistleblowing, managers can reduce the anticipated regret about internal whistleblowing that
employees undoubtedly experience.
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Appendix 3A: Scenario and Instruction for the Experiment

You work for a drug company that has developed a web-based system for individuals to maintain
their Electronic Health Records. You have recently learned that your company is mining the
protected health information and is using it to market its drug products. This use of protected
health information violates the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) and could cause financial, reputational, or other harm should the information fall into
the wrong hands. The management is aware that the mining of health records and its use for
marketing purposes is in violation of HIPAA. This is not the first time your company has
illegally mined health records and used them for marketing purposes.
Now, you are faced with the decision on whether or not to bring your company’s actions to
the attention of others outside the organization. If you decide to report your company’s
actions, you could lose your job. If you remain silent, however, one or more individuals
could suffer financial, reputational, or other harm should their protected health information
fall into the wrong hands.
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Appendix 3B: Constructs and Measurement Items

Whistleblowing

Category

Construct

Whistleblowin
g Intention

Nature of Wrongdoing

Intentionality
of Wrongdoing

Stability of
Wrongdoing

Construct
Description

(Scale Format)
Measurement Items

Informing
Sources

A decision to disclose
illegal, unethical, or
illegitimate IT
practices of a
company, to persons
or organizations that
may be able to effect
action.

(Definitely Not/Definitely)
(1-7 scale)
1. Would you report your
company’s actions with
respect to HIPAA to an
external auditor?
2. Would you tell an outside
authority, like the Department
of Health and Human Services
(HHS), about your company’s
actions with respect to
HIPAA?
The manipulation check asked
whether the HIPAA violation
of the company was
intentional.

(Gundlach
2003; Miceli
and Near
1984; Miceli
and Near
1985)

The manipulation check asked
whether the illegal mining of
health records was part of an
ongoing pattern of behavior.

(Gundlach
2003;
Weiner
1985)

(Not Very Serious/
Very Serious)
(1-7 scale)
1. How serious is the potential
harm to individuals from
HIPAA violations?
(Not at all/Very Much)(17scale)
2. How much financial,
reputational, or other harm
could result from the use of
protected health information
for marketing purposes?

(Gundlach
2003; Miceli
and Near
1985; Miceli
and Near
1992)

A type of causal
attribution. It indicates
whether one
purposively or
knowingly
(intentional) brings out
specific consequences
or not purposively
(unintentional).
A type of causal
attribution. It indicates
whether one brings out
specific consequences
in constant/invariant
effort (stable) or
immediate/variant
effort (unstable).
The extent to which a
particular wrongful
activity recurs or
involves substantial
consequences.

Seriousness of
Wrongdoing
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(Betancourt
and Blair
1992;
Weiner
1985)

Emotion
Control Variable

Anticipated
Regret about
Remaining
Silent

Fear of
Retaliation

A comparisonbased anticipated
emotion. It occurs
when individuals
imagine that negative
consequences may
occur from a decision
and that the most
preferred option
(remaining silent) is
not superior to another
option
(whistleblowing).

A basic, biologically
primitive emotion. A
type of anticipatory
fear. It is likely to
experience as
individuals are
contemplating their
responses to a specific
situation (retaliation).
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(No Regret/Very Much
Regret)
(1-7 scale)
If you decided to remain
silent on your company’s
action and then later found out
that an individual was fired
because his confidential health
records of depression and
suicide attempts were used to
send free samples of an antidepressant to his work address,
to what extent would you
regret your decision to remain
silent?
(Strongly Disagree/
Strongly Agree)(1-7 scale)
1. I fear that my supervisor at
the drug company would take
action against me if I were to
report the company's illegal
activities to outsiders.
2. I fear that superiors in the
drug company above the level
of my supervisor would take
action against me if I were to
report the company's illegal
activities to outsiders.
3. I fear that the drug company
would NOT effectively protect
me from reprisal if I disclosed
illegal activities to outsiders.

(Wong et al.
2006;
Zeelenberg
et al. 1998b)

(Keenan
1990)

Chapter 4
The Role of Anticipated Process Regret in Process Documentation
Decision

4.1 Introduction
Process documentation is an explicit representation of a process, and includes complex
relationships among goals, information, resources, activities, and people in a given workflow
(Ungan 2006, p. 138). It also includes , process knowledge which describes reasons behind
design decisions or design rationale (Ramesh and Dhar 1992).Process documentation helps the
detection of critical issues (Ungan 2006) and facilitates knowledge sharing and shared
understanding among the stakeholders, hence enhances collaboration (Biemborn et al. 2008).
However, Lethbridge et al. (2003), based on a qualitative study of documentation practices,
find that software engineers resist process documentation because of the significant effort and
costs involved in creating it. They further point out that project participants “consciously or
subconsciously make value judgments and conclude that it’s worthwhile to update only certain
types of documentation” (p. 38). Xu and Ramesh (2008) suggest that the extent (or level of detail)
of process documentation may affect process task performance under uncertainty. These studies
suggest that the decision on the extent of process documentation (which Xu and Ramesh (2008)
categorize as contextualized process documentation, generalized process documentation, and no
process documentation) that is created for a project is made based on the decision makers’
judgment about the level of uncertainty caused by the project environment, expected time and
effort involved in creating the documentation, and the expected outcomes.
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To mitigate uncertainty, decision makers often rely on intuition or gut feeling that is based on
emotional experiences such as experienced regret or anticipated regret (Lankton and Luft 2008).
In contrast to other types of emotions (such as fear, anger, shame, and guilt), regret significantly
influences one’s decision making (Zeelenberg and Pieters 2007). Regret is a comparison-based
emotion because it occurs when “the most preferred alternative is not necessarily superior to
another alternative” (Janis and Mann 1977a, p. 223). Bell (1982) and Lomes and Sugden (1982a)
conclude that decision makers take their feeling of regret into account while making decisions
under uncertainty. Regret theory has been used to explain decision making behaviors in
numerous situations including the following: consumer purchase decision (Simonson 1992b;
Tsiros and Mittal 2000), investment decisions (Lin et al. 2006a), emotional insurance (Gilbert et
al. 2004b), and escalation in project management (Ku 2008; Wong and Kwong 2007). Especially,
anticipated regret is a critical input in decision making under uncertainty because it is an
affective response to anticipated outcomes of a decision (Zeelenberg and Pieters 2007). Prior
studies establish that affective responses are a critical driver of decision making behavior
(Passyn and Sujan 2006). Furthermore, the literature indicates that when decision makers are
accountable and responsible for the decision outcome, they are more likely to experience regret
(Passyn and Sujan 2006; Zeelenberg et al. 2000b).
Prior literature on process documentation points out that an inappropriate decision on the
extent of process documentation can create significant problems such as the loss of design
rationale and design decisions (Ramesh and Dhar 1992), miscommunication and
misunderstanding among business partners (Biemborn et al. 2008), and wasted time, effort, and
resources due to excessive documentation (Lethbridge et al. 2003). However, prior research has
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not devoted much attention to examining how the decision on the extent of process
documentation is made by project personnel in IT projects that are characterized by uncertainty.
The literature on regret suggests that, in order to mitigate uncertainty, decision makers use a
reference point and compare their decision alternatives based on this reference point (Kahneman
1992). Prospective losses or gains relative to each reference point can influence the feeling of
anticipated regret, and thus lead to regret minimizing choices (Lin et al. 2006a). Therefore, we
seek to understand how decision makers use a reference point and compare process
documentation options (e.g., contextualized, generalized, or no process documentation) and, how
they take emotion, specifically anticipated regret, into account while making the decision to
invest in process documentation.
Furthermore, agile development differs significantly from traditional development in terms
of its emphasis on informal communication among project stakeholders in contrast to formal
documentation (Fernandez and Fernandez 2008; Vinekar et al. 2006). However, the question on
how decision makers who are involved in such development projects make decisions on
investing in process documentation remains unexplored.
Specifically, the following research questions guide this study:


Does requirements uncertainty, accountability, and the type of project (traditional vs.
agile) influence anticipated regret to invest in process documentation?



Does anticipated regret influence the decision to invest in different levels of process
documentation?

To answer these questions, we conducted a scenario-based experiment with IS project managers.
In section 4.2, we present literature review for this research; in the section 4.3, we develop our
research framework, hypotheses and their rationale; in sections 4.4 and 4.5, research
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methodology and data analysis are explicated; and finally, in section 4.6, we discuss implications
and contributions to theory and practice.
4.2 Literature Review
4.2.1 Regret Theory
4.2.1.1. Counterfactual Thinking
People experience regret when the counterfactual outcome of a forgone alternative is better than
the actual outcome of a chosen alternative, and people rejoice when they face the opposite
condition (Inman et al. 1997). The psychological comparison process, in which people compare
actual outcomes with alternative outcome(s) or compare anticipated outcomes of the preferred
option with anticipated outcomes of the alternatives, is called counterfactual thinking (Hetts et al.
2000; Roese 1997). Counterfactual (“contrary to the facts”) (Roese 1997, p. 133) thinking
generally uses conditional propositions that consist of two components: precedence (e.g., “if only
I had done A”) and its outcomes (e.g., “B would not have happened”). Counterfactual thinking
leads people to consider alternatives and regret avoidance behaviors (Hetts et al. 2000;
Zeelenberg and Pieters 2007). The location of a reference point relative to which an outcome is
evaluated by a typical decision maker (Bazerman and Moore 2009) plays an important role in the
valuation of the gain or loss in the comparison (Kahneman 1992).
4.2.1.2 Anticipated Regret
Regret is experienced as a sinking feeling or a self-blaming feeling and with thoughts about the
mistakes made. It is often accompanied by a desired goal to undo the decision (Zeelenberg et al.
1998a). Anticipated regret is a comparison-based emotion that influences decision making
(Zeelenberg and Pieters 2007). When decision makers realize that the current situation is
uncertain and a decision is important and difficult, they anticipate future regret (Zeelenberg and
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Pieters 2007). Also, when the anticipated outcome of the most preferred option is not necessarily
superior to alternatives available, they experience anticipated regret (Janis and Mann 1977a).
Anticipated regret involves counterfactual thinking on future outcomes of an option (Hetts et al.
2000). When self-accountability is high, regret is more likely to occur (Passyn and Sujan 2006).
These feeling of anticipated regret leads decision makers to change their decisions and to
choose regret minimizing options (Janis and Mann 1977a; Zeelenberg and Pieters 2007).
Anticipated regret leads decision makers to consider future anticipated outcomes at the current
time, and hence facilitates regret avoidance (Reb 2008). For instance, in order to avoid
anticipated regret related to making a wrong decision, consumers prefer purchasing an item
currently on sale rather than waiting for a better sale (Simonson 1992b). They also prefer a
higher-priced, well known brand, rather than a less expensive, lesser known brand. Since regret
theory has been used to a variety of domains for understanding decision making under
uncertainty, it is very suitable for studying decision making about the creation of process
documentation under uncertainty. Among the various types of uncertainty that characterize IT
projects, requirements uncertainty has been recognized as very critical in shaping decisions about
the IS development process.
4.2.2 Requirements uncertainty
In IT projects, both traditional or agile, requirement analysis is the most critical stage since its
influence on other stages is inevitable (Zmud 1980). According to Nidumolu (1995; 1996),
requirements uncertainty occurs due to requirement instability, requirement diversity, and
requirement unanalyzability. Nidumolu (1996, p. 79-80) defines requirement instability as “the
extent of change in user requirements over the course of the project,” requirement diversity as
“the extent to which users differ among themselves in their requirements,” and requirement
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analyzability as “ the extent to which the process of converting user needs to a set of
requirements specifications can be reduced to mechanical steps or objective procedures.” In this
study, we use requirement instability as a measure of uncertainty because continuously changing
requirements is a major project risk factor (Wallace and Keil 2004). Requirement instability
generally results in the deletion or modification of existing requirements as well as the addition
of new requirements (Pfahl and Lebsanft 2000). This influences project cost, project schedule
and the quality of products and services (Stark et al. 1999).
Requirements uncertainty can create anticipated regret (Bell 1982) which is taken into
account in decision making (Bell 1982; Loomes and Sugden 1982a; Zeelenberg and Pieters
2004). When decision makers are uncertain on decision outcomes and the environment relevant
to a decision, it is hard for them to think through all possible decision paths and outcomes (van
Dijk and Zeelenberg 2005). Therefore, they often rely on gut feelings grounded in experienced
regret or anticipated regret (Lankton and Luft 2008). In our study, we suggest that when
requirements uncertainty is high, decision makers may take more vigilant actions by
documenting contextualized process knowledge in order to mitigate the uncertainty and avoid
anticipated regret.
4.2.3 Accountability
Tetlock (1992, p. 331) describes accountability as “the implicit or explicit expectation that one
be called on to justify one’s beliefs, feelings, and actions to others.” Though the notion may
appear to be similar to the attribution of responsibility, it is distinctly different. While
accountability is based on “performance evaluation or public feedback pressure,” responsibility
is based on “private commitment to the importance of the task, particularly the judgment
outcome” (Rozelle and Baxter 1981, p. 438). Rozelle and Baxter (1981) find that accountability
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presents more immediate and visible impact on judgment behavior than responsibility. Further
Smith et al. (1993) argue that accountability is more directly related to emotion than
responsibility. Self-accountability related to guilt and regret leads to preventive or corrective
behaviors (Smith and Lazarus 1993). In IT projects, accountability can be a critical factor that
influences process documentation decision for the following reasons: first, it improves goal
salience in decision making (Quinn and Schlenker 2002); second, due to cognitive dissonance, it
leads decision makers to invest significant efforts towards justifying their conduct (Tetlock et al.
1989); third, it facilitates motivation and improves task performance (Lerner and Tetlock 1999;
Quinn and Schlenker 2002).
4.2.4 Types of Process Documentation
Xu and Ramesh (2008) propose two types of process knowledge: generalized knowledge and
contextualized knowledge. General knowledge is defined as “knowledge that is high in domain
knowledge specificity but low in contextual knowledge specificity” (Xu and Ramesh 2008, p.
282). Algorithms, mathematical models, and general rules are examples of generalized
knowledge. Contextualized knowledge is defined as knowledge that is “both high domain
specificity and high contextual knowledge specificity” (Xu and Ramesh 2008, p. 284). The
components of contextualized knowledge embrace problem specification, information cues on a
context of problems, strategic knowledge, and causal knowledge. Based on two types of process
knowledge proposed by Xu and Ramesh (2008), in this study, we refer to ‘documentation of
contextualized knowledge’ as contextualized process documentation and ‘documentation of
generalized knowledge’ as generalized process documentation. No process documentation
simply indicates that no documentation of any process knowledge is created. Contextualized
process documentation includes contextualized problems that need to be resolved, the context in
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which the problem was faced, alternative solutions considered, assumptions made, the solution
that was adopted, and the reasons for adopting the chosen solution. Generalized process
documentation includes only the problems that need to be resolved and the solutions adopted.
Generally, as the level of detail in process documentation increases, process documentation
becomes more complex and requires more time and effort to create it (Ungan 2006).
4.2.5 Reference Point
Reference points which are “characterized by the abrupt changes in the valuation of gains and
losses and of acceptable or reprehensible behavior” (Kahneman 1992, p. 296) play an important
role in decision making under uncertainty. According to Bazerman and Moore (2009), “the
typical decision maker evaluates outcomes relative to a neutral reference point” (p. 64). Tsiros
(1998) identifies two reference points: expected outcome and outcome of the forgone alternative.
In his study, best-performing forgone option serves as a reference point for comparison and
affects regret when the chosen outcome is better than the expectation. In contrast, worstperforming forgone option serves as a reference point for comparison and affects regret when
chosen outcome is worse than the expectation. Extending Tsiros’s work (1998), Lin et al. (2006a)
find multiple reference points used by stock investors (p. 790): (1) the value of their outcomes
might have been had they not invested; (2) their expected outcomes; and (3) the best-performing
unchosen stocks. These studies show how reference points in multiple option situations can
influence experienced regret about post-choice valuation. In IT projects, project managers are
often required to compare multiple options related to the extent of process documentation:
contextualized process documentation, generalized process documentation, and no process
documentation (Lethbridge et al. 2003).
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Prior research further suggests that, in pre-choice valuation, anticipated alternative outcome(s)
also can serve as reference points for comparison (Bell 1982; Boles and Messick 1995; Loomes
and Sugden 1982a). In a study on how multiple reference points affect the evaluation of
outcomes and decisions, Boles and Messick (1995, p. 262) argue that, an alternative outcome is
more likely to be evoked as a reference point when: (1) another choice would have led to the
alternative outcome; (2) social comparison with others who received the alternative outcome is
done; and (3) the alternative outcome is in a different evaluative domain than the outcome
received (i.e., it is negative when the outcome received is positive). Zeelenberg and van Dijk
(1997) point out that anticipated regret about pre-choice valuation can be affected by multiple
reference points. They suggest several potential reference points at which anticipated outcomes
can be evaluated (p. 683): the status quo, the aspiration level, and the outcomes of different
alternatives. In pre-choice valuation, an option can be more attractive to decision makers when (1)
its anticipated outcome will be more positive relative to the outcome of status quo, (2) its
anticipated outcome will be more positive relative to the alternative outcome, and (3) it may lead
to a type of affective contrast (i.e., positive vs. negative) that will emphasize its positivity (Boles
and Messick 1995, p. 270). Thus, anticipated alternative outcome(s) can serve as reference points
in pre-choice valuation.
In the context of process documentation decision in traditional IT projects, for instance, when
a decision maker’s most preferred option, viz. contextualized process documentation, is superior
to generalized process documentation due to high requirements instability of the IT project and
high accountability, the decision maker can experience low level of anticipated regret. Thus, the
low anticipated regret about contextualized process documentation and high anticipated regret
about generalized process documentation may lead a decision maker to choose the former. In this
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Control Variables
Requirements
Uncertainty

Firm Size, Age, Education

H1a (-)
H1b (+)

Anticipated Regret about
Contextualized Process
Documentation

H1c (+)

H4a (-)
H2a (-)
Anticipated Regret about
Generalized Process
Documentation

H2b (+)

Accountability

H4b (+)

Decision
to Invest

H2c (+)
H4c (+)
Anticipated Regret about
No Process Documentation

H3a (+)
H3b (+)

Type of Project
(Traditional vs. Agile)

H3c (-)

Figure 1. Research Model
case, the generalized process documentation option serves as a reference point in the pre-choice
valuation.
4.3 Research Model and Hypotheses
4.3.1 Research Model
Our research model presented in Figure 1 depicts how requirements uncertainty, accountability,
and the type of project influences anticipated regret about the extent of process documentation
(contextualized, generalized, and no process documentations) and how anticipated regret
influences the decision to invest in process documentation. In the next section, we develop
research hypotheses and their rationale based on current literature.
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4.3.2 Hypotheses and Their Rationale
4.3.2.1 Requirements uncertainty to Anticipated Regret about Process Documentation
(H1a-H1c)
As user requirements keep changing over the course of a project, requirements uncertainty
increases. As requirements uncertainty increases, decision makers’ pre-choice valuation of the
contextualized process documentation option may increase. Here, reference points play an
important role in creating regret (Lin et al. 2006a; Tsiros 1998). Prior studies (Bell 1982; Boles
and Messick 1995; Loomes and Sugden 1982a) suggest that anticipated alternative outcomes can
serve as reference points for comparison in pre-choice valuation because decision makers are
more likely to prefer anticipated positive outcome of an option to anticipated negative outcomes
of alternatives (Boles and Messick 1995). If decision maker’s preferred option is not superior to
the other alternatives, then regret is evoked (Janis and Mann 1977a). The comparison process,
called counterfactual thinking, can involve upward counterfactuals or downward counterfactuals
(Roese 1994). Upward counterfactuals depict “alternatives that are better than what actually
happened”, while downward counterfactuals depict “alternatives that are worse than reality”
(Roese 1994, p.805-6). In pre-choice valuation situations where the outcomes of a decision and
its alternatives are not realized yet, anticipated upward and downward counterfactuals are
commonly used (Hetts et al. 2000). For instance, when a project manager compares generalized
process documentation with the other alternatives, s/he may value the foregone alternatives as
either better (e.g., “if only I would choose contextualized process documentation, I could
preserve more process knowledge”) or worse (e.g., “at least, I would not lose general process
knowledge”). The counterfactuals can create negative emotions such as regret (Hetts et al. 2000;
Roese 1994). In the case above, the upward counterfactual may evoke high anticipated regret
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Table 1. Summary of Rationale for H1a-H1c
Requirements uncertainty
Low
Option
Preferred Option: GPD
 Upward
Greater
Contextualized Process
counterfactual anticipated regret
Documentation (CPD)
about CPD
 RP: GPD
 Downward
Generalized Process
Less anticipated
counterfactual
Documentation (GPD)
regret about GPD
 RP: NPD
 Upward
Greater
No Process
counterfactual anticipated regret
Documentation (NPD)
about NPD
 RP: GPD
Note: RP stands for reference point.








High
Preferred Option: CPD
Downward
Less anticipated
counterfactual
regret about CPD
RP: GPD/ NPD
Upward
Greater
counterfactual
anticipated regret
about GPD
RP: CPD
Upward
Greater
counterfactual
anticipated regret
about NPD
RP: CPD

about choosing generalized process documentation and low anticipated regret about choosing
contextualized process documentation. The downward counterfactual may elicit low anticipated
regret about choosing generalized process documentation. Upward counterfactuals may motivate
decision makers to improve performance, while downward counterfactuals may make decision
makers feel better (Roese 1994).
Under high levels of requirements uncertainty, decision makers compare anticipated
outcomes of the preferred option (say, contextualized process documentation) with a reference
point, (say, anticipated outcome of generalized process documentation) (see Table 1). Engaging
in downward counterfactual thinking, decision makers can realize the benefits of contextualized
process documentation option (e.g., process knowledge preservation) over generalized process
documentation option. Thus, anticipated regret about contextualized process documentation is
less likely to occur. This is because, as requirements uncertainty increases, contextualized
process documentation option is superior relative to the generalized documentation option.
Although contextualized process documentation takes more time and effort than the generalized
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documentation option, it is superior for the purpose of mitigating requirements uncertainty.
Therefore, we hypothesize that:
H1a: A higher level of requirements uncertainty is more likely to lead to less anticipated
regret about contextualized process documentation.

As requirements uncertainty increases, we propose, decision makers’ pre-choice valuation of
generalized process documentation option decreases. Decision makers use upward
counterfactuals and compare the anticipated outcome of generalized process documentation
option with a reference point, ie., the anticipated outcome of contextualized process
documentation (see Table 1). Since the generalized process documentation option is not
necessarily superior to the contextualized documentation option (e.g., due to process knowledge
loss), we expect that anticipated regret about generalized process documentation is more likely to
occur as requirements uncertainty increases. Decision makers may also engage in downward
counterfactuals (e.g., “at least, I would not lose general process knowledge”), when compared to
creating no process documentation. However, prior studies suggest (Lin et al. 2006a) that
downward counterfactual does not reduce regret when decision makers perceive a decision as
controllable. We argue that decision makers perceive the process documentation decision as
controllable. Therefore, while upward counterfactual influences the anticipated regret, downward
counterfactual does not influence anticipated regret.
H1b: A higher level of requirements uncertainty is more likely to lead to greater anticipated
regret about generalized process documentation.
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We also propose that as requirements uncertainty increases, decision makers’ pre-choice
valuation of the ‘no process documentation’ option decreases. Decision makers engage in
upward counterfactual to compare the anticipated outcome of ‘no process documentation’ option
with reference point(s), viz., anticipated outcomes of generalized and/or contextualized process
documentation (see Table 1). From the perspective of benefits, ‘no process documentation’
option is not necessarily superior to contextualized and/or generalized process documentation
options. Zeelenberg et al. (2002) suggest that when decision makers anticipate negative
consequence of an option, they experience more regret on inaction than on action. Therefore,
even though requirements uncertainty is low, we suggest that decision makers experience high
levels of anticipated regret about creating no process documentation. But as requirements
uncertainty increases, the level of anticipated regret associated with creating no process
documentation increases even more.
H1c: A higher level of requirements uncertainty is more likely to lead to greater anticipated
regret about no process documentation.

4.3.2.2 Accountability to Anticipated Regret about Process Documentation (H2a-H2c)
We propose that accountability influences anticipated regret associated with process
documentation options. Passyn and Sujan (2006) find a positive relationship between high selfaccountability and the regret experienced by decision makers. When accountability is high (for
example, when the decision is subject to an audit by an independent party), decision makers are
likely experience the pressure to perform well. Therefore, they are more careful in their
evaluation of the anticipated outcomes of alternatives. Rozelle and Baxter (1981) suggest that
‘attention effect’ may play a role in this situation. High accountability facilitates motivation and
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Table 2. Summary of Rationale for H2a-H2c
Accountability
Low
Option
Preferred Option: GPD
 Upward
Greater
Contextualized Process
counterfactual anticipated regret
Documentation (CPD)
about CPD
 RP: GPD
 Downward
Generalized Process
Less anticipated
counterfactual
Documentation (GPD)
regret about GPD
 RP: NPD
 Upward
Greater
No Process
counterfactual anticipated regret
Documentation (NPD)
about NPD
 RP: GPD
Note: RP stands for reference point.








High
Preferred Option: CPD
Downward
Less anticipated
counterfactual
regret about CPD
RP: GPD/ NPD
Upward
Greater
counterfactual
anticipated regret
about GPD
RP: CPD
Upward
Greater
counterfactual
anticipated regret
about NPD
RP: CPD

improves goal salience in decision making (Quinn and Schlenker 2002). Also decision makers
tend to invest significant effort towards justifying their conduct (Tetlock et al. 1989).
Here, decision makers also engage in upward and downward counterfactuals to compare a
preferred option with reference point(s) (see Table 2). Under high level of accountability,
decision makers compare anticipated outcomes of the preferred option (contextualized process
documentation) with a reference point (say, anticipated outcome of generalized or no process
documentation) (see Table 2). Engaging in downward counterfactual thinking, decision makers
can realize the benefits of contextualized process documentation option (e.g., process knowledge
preservation for future need) over generalized process documentation option. Thus, anticipated
regret about contextualized process documentation is less likely to occur. This is because, as
requirements uncertainty increases, contextualized process documentation option is superior
relative to the generalized documentation option. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
H2a: A higher level of accountability is more likely to lead to less anticipated regret about
contextualized process documentation.
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However, decision makers with high accountability can experience high anticipated regret
about creating generalized process documentation and no process documentation. Here the same
mechanism of upward counterfactuals (discussed in H1b and H1c) influence decision makers’
pre-choice valuation of generalized or no process documentation options (Lin et al. 2006a).
Because either generalized or no process documentation option is not necessarily superior to the
contextualized documentation option (e.g., due to the loss of design rationale and design
decisions, miscommunication among business partners) (Biemborn et al. 2008; Ramesh and
Dhar 1992), we expect that anticipated regret about generalized process documentation is more
likely to occur as accountability increases. Thus, we hypothesize that:
H2b: A higher level of accountability is more likely to lead to greater anticipated regret
about generalized process documentation.

Particularly, from the perspective of benefits, ‘no process documentation’ option is not
necessarily superior to other process documentation options. As mentioned in H1c, we also
expect that even though accountability is low, decision makers experience high levels of
anticipated regret about no process documentation. However as accountability increases, the
level of anticipated regret associated with no process documentation increases even more.
H2c: A higher level of accountability is more likely to lead to greater anticipated regret
about no process documentation.

4.3.2.3 Type of Project to Anticipated Regret about Process Documentation (H3a-H3c)
Important differences between traditional and agile development projects have been well
established in the literature. First, traditional projects are defined with linear processes and
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management approaches and stable, consistent requirements (Augustine et al. 2005). Traditional
projects try to reduce changes in the course of the project through rigorous requirements
gathering, analysis, and design under a controlled schedule. They focus on prediction and control.
In contrast, in agile projects, changes are inevitable. They focus on achieving adaptation and
innovation over a linear development process (Vinekar et al. 2006). Second, traditional projects
are characterized by well-documented and understood features or requirements. They tend to
adhere to well-documented matrices for managing budget, schedule, and scope. On the other
hand, agile projects discover project requirements while in iterative development cycles. Agile
projects focus on a project, instead of adherence to a process such as creating rigorous
documentation (Fernandez and Fernandez 2008).
We propose that agile development projects differs from traditional development projects in
terms of the influence on anticipated regret on creating different types of process documentations.
The same mechanism of upward counterfactual occurred in H1b or H1c can be applied in
decision makers’ pre-choice valuation of contextualized or generalized process documentation
option (Lin et al. 2006a) (see Table 3). Compared with decision makers in traditional projects,
Table 3. Summary of Rationale for H3a-H3c
Type of Project
Traditional
Option
Preferred Option: CPD or GPD
 Downward
Contextualized Process
Less anticipated
counterfactual
Documentation (CPD)
regret about CPD
 RP: GPD
 Downward
Generalized Process
Less anticipated
counterfactual
Documentation (GPD)
regret about GPD
 RP: NPD
 Upward
Greater
No Process
counterfactual anticipated regret
Documentation (NPD)
about NPD
 RP: GPD
Note: RP stands for reference point.
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Agile
Preferred Option: NPD
Upward
Greater
counterfactual
anticipated regret
RP: GPD/ NPD about CPD
Upward
Greater
counterfactual
anticipated regret
about GPD
RP: NPD
Downward
Less anticipated
counterfactual
regret about NPD
RP: GPD/ CPD

decision makers in agile projects are more likely to desire to minimize the cost of moving
information between people and prefer communicating in person, instead of making an effort in
documentation (Cockburn and Highsmith 2001). Because either contextualized or generalized
process documentation option is not necessarily superior to no process documentation option
(e.g., due to wasting resources in creating documentations), we expect that anticipated regret
about contextualized and generalized process documentations is more likely to occur in agile
projects. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
H3a: When compared to traditional projects, agile projects are more likely to lead to greater
anticipated regret about contextualized process documentation.
H3b: When compared to traditional projects, agile projects are more likely to lead to greater
anticipated regret about generalized process documentation.

The same mechanism of downward counterfactual occurred in H1a also influences decision
makers’ pre-choice valuation of no process documentation option (Lin et al. 2006a) (see Table 3).
Because agile project environments involve high uncertainty and risk, decision makers in agile
projects consider delivering high-quality products and services to the customer quickly more
important than creating extensive documentation.(Vinekar et al. 2006). Engaging in downward
counterfactual, decision makers can realize the advantages of no process documentation option
(e.g., saving resources to create documentations)) over contextualized or generalized process
documentation option. Thus, anticipated regret about documentation is less likely to occur. This
is because, in agile project environments, no process documentation option is superior relative to
the other documentation options. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
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H3c: When compared to traditional projects, agile projects are more likely to lead to less
anticipated regret about no process documentation.

4.3.2.4 Anticipated Regret about Process Documentation to Decision to Invest in Process
Documentation (H4a-H4c)
Decision makers apply their anticipated regret in subsequent decision making (Bell 1982;
Loomes and Sugden 1982a; Zeelenberg and Pieters 2004). Since decision makers are regret
averse, they are more likely to choose a regret minimizing option (e.g., Zeelenberg & Pieters,
2007; Reb, 2008). In Wong and Kwong (2007)’s study, for example, decision makers who have
high anticipated regret about withdrawal from a project are more likely to escalate their
commitment, while those who have high anticipated regret about persistence are less likely to
escalate their commitment. In similar spirit, we propose that high anticipated regret about
creating contextualized process documentation is less likely to lead decision makers to invest
time and effort involved in creating this documentation.
H4a: A higher level of anticipated regret about contextualized process documentation is less
likely to lead to a decision to create contextualized process documentation.

On the contrary, decision makers who have high anticipated regret about creating generalized
process documentation are more likely to invest time and effort in creating contextualized
process documentation. Therefore we hypothesize that:
H4b: A higher level of anticipated regret about generalized process documentation is more
likely to lead to a decision to create contextualized process documentation.
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Based on the regret aversion tendency, we also propose that decision makers who have high
anticipated regret about creating no process documentation tend to invest more time and effort in
process documentation.
H4c: A higher level of anticipated regret about creating no process documentation is more
likely to lead to a decision to create generalized or contextualized process
documentation.

4.3.2.5 Control Variables
We also added the following demographic variables as control variables that may influence
decision to invest in process documentation: firm size, age, and level of education.
4.4 Research Methodology
To evaluate the hypotheses presented in Figure 1, we conducted a scenario-based experiment
(see Appendix 4A). This study explores a complex human decision making process, which
involves investigating relationships among requirements uncertainty, accountability, the type of
project, emotion (anticipated regret), and a decision to invest in process documentation. The
experiment involves a 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design, in which three factors are involved: type of
project, requirements uncertainty, and uncertainty. Type of project, a setting, was varied between
traditional and agile software development projects. The level of requirements uncertainty and
the level of accountability were manipulated independently. Through manipulation of
independent variables, a scenario based approach can allow researchers to capture many essential
features of real contexts (Straub and Karahanna 1998). In prior research on regret, scenariobased experiments have been widely used in various fields including: consumer decision making
(Simonson 1992b; Tsiros and Mittal 2000), multiple reference points in investment decision
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making (Lin et al. 2006a), regret aversion in the decision to play a lottery (Zeelenberg and
Pieters 2004), escalation of commitment (Wong and Kwong 2007), and information technology
real options (Lankton and Luft 2008).
4.4.1 Subjects
Data were gathered from 315 IT project leaders and managers, leaving us with 296 usable
responses. The characteristics of these subjects were presented in Table 4. Using contacts that we
have established with professional organizations such as the Project Management Institute and IT
industry association, we recruited subjects for participation in the study. Snowball sampling was
used where additional subjects were recruited based on referrals from participants in the study.
Table 4. Subject Characteristics
N = 296 (Mean)
40.3
15.6

Demographics
Age
Years of IT experience
Years of project
management experience
Firm size (# of employee)
 < 10000
 =< 100000
 =< 400000
Highest education level
 Undergraduate
 Master
 Ph.D.

10.6
20 %
71 %
9%
48 %
50 %
2%

Subjects participated in the experiment by completing an online survey. The subjects were
randomly assigned to each condition.
4.4.2 Scenario and Procedure
After reading basic instructions about the experiment, subjects were asked to read a scenario
about process documentation decision making in software development project. They were asked
to play the role of an IT project manager (see Appendix 4A). The setting was varied in traditional
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and agile projects. The level of requirements uncertainty (high or low), the level of
accountability (high or low) were manipulated independently to generate eight treatment
conditions. The common information in the scenario includes (1) a brief description of project
task and process documentation decision in a software project; (2) a description on three possible
decision options: detailed (contextualized) process documentation, basic (generalized) process
documentation, and no process documentation; and (3) a description on conditions: the
requirements uncertainty level (high or low), the accountability level (high or low), and the type
of project (agile or traditional project). Manipulation checks were used to ensure that the subjects
perceive the treatments properly (Boudreau et al. 2001; Straub et al. 2004). Subjects answered
questions on their levels of anticipated regret about three process documentation options and the
decision to invest in process documentation. The instrument also contains measures for control
variables and basic demographic information (see Appendix 4B).
4.4.3 Constructs and Measures
All key constructs in the model were measured using multiple-items, 7-point likert scales.
Measures for anticipated regret about different levels of three process documentation options
were adapted from the literature (Boudreau et al. 2001; Straub et al. 2004). New scales were
developed for the ‘decision to invest in process documentation’ based on literature review. All
the instruments were refined with a small group of IT professionals and academic experts. Pilot
tests were conducted with business school students enrolled in information systems courses at a
large urban university in the southeastern United States and refined the adapted scales and to
identify unanticipated difficulties before conducting the main experiment (Straub 1989). The
measurement items are summarized in the Appendix 4B. An overview of the manipulation items
and the main constructs is provided in Table 5.
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Table 5. Constructs Used in the Study
Construct

Requirements
uncertainty

Accountability

Type of Project

Anticipated
Regret about
Contextualized
Process
Documentation
Anticipated
Regret about
Generalized
Process
Documentation
Anticipated
Regret about
No Process
Documentation
Decision to
Invest in
Process
Documentation

Description

Role in
Nomology

Requirements uncertainty occurs due to requirement
instability, requirement diversity, and requirement
unanalyzability. In this study, requirement instability
(the extent of change in user requirements over the
course of the project) is adapted to measure
requirements uncertainty.

Independent
variable
(Manipulated)

The implicit or explicit expectation that one be called
on to justify one’s beliefs, feelings, and actions to
others.

Traditional projects are defined with linear processes
and management approaches and stable, consistent
requirements. Agile projects with flexibility discover
project requirements while doing the project in
iterations and reducing uncertainty. Agile projects
focus on achieving adaptation and innovation over
adherence to a defined development process.
A comparison-based anticipated emotion. It occurs
when individuals imagine that negative consequences
may occur from a decision and that the most
preferred option (contextualized process
documentation) is not superior to other option(s)
(generalized and/or no process documentations).
A comparison-based anticipated emotion. It occurs
when individuals imagine that negative consequences
may occur from a decision and that the most
preferred option (generalized process documentation)
is not superior to other option(s) (contextualized
and/or no process documentations).
A comparison-based anticipated emotion. It occurs
when individuals imagine that negative consequences
may occur from a decision and that the most
preferred option (no process documentation) is not
superior to other option(s) (contextualized and/or
generalized process documentations).
A decision on the extent (level of detail) of process
documentation (contextualized, generalized, or no
process documentation)
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Independent
variable
(Manipulated)

Independent
variable
(setting)

Sources
(Nidumolu
1995;
Nidumolu
1996)
(Lerner and
Tetlock 1999),
(Quinn and
Schlenker
2002),
(Zhang and
Mittal 2005)
(Cockburn and
Highsmith
2001)
(Augustine et
al. 2005)
(Vinekar et al.
2006)

(Simonson
1992b),
(Zeelenberg et
al. 1998b),
(Tsiros and
Mittal 2000),
(Wong and
Kwong 2007),
(Lankton and
Luft 2008)

Ultimate
Dependent
Variable

(Ungan 2006;
Xu and
Ramesh 2008)

4.5 Analysis and Results
4.5.1 Manipulation Checks
Manipulation checks were conducted to examine whether requirements uncertainty and
accountability manipulations were working. The manipulation check for requirements
uncertainty asked subjects to indicate whether they perceived project requirements to be
significantly different from development to maintenance (1 = strongly disagree (i.e., low level of
requirements uncertainty); 7 = strongly agree (i.e., high level of requirements uncertainty)). The
manipulation check for accountability asked subjects to indicate whether they perceived the
impact of the decision to create process documentation on their career and compensation when
they will (or will not) be subject to process audit (1 = strongly disagree (i.e., low level of
accountability); 7 = strongly agree (i.e., high level of accountability)).
To see whether manipulations work, we conducted regression analysis where we can predict
the actual assignment of groups via the manipulation checks (Perdue and Summers 1986). Each
treatment was coded as a 1 (for high) or 0 (for low) based on the type of scenarios. This binary
data and the interval level data from manipulation questions were used for analysis. If
researchers can significantly predict a relationship, it indicates that the manipulation works. Both
requirements uncertainty ( = 0.900, p < 0.001) and accountability ( = 0.286, p < 0.001) were
significantly predicted, indicating that the manipulations were effective.
4.5.2 Common Method Bias Assessment
To assess the threat of common method bias, we conducted the following: (1) Harmon’s singlefactor test (Podsakoff and Organ 1986), (2) marker variable test (Lindell and Whitney 2001), and
(3) correlation analysis (Bagozzi et al. 1991). The results of Harmon’s single-factor test indicated
that no single factor accounts for the bulk of the covariance. Next, we conducted Lindell and
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Whitney’s (2001) marker variable test. We used a theoretically unrelated construct (‘mobile
internet use’) to adjust the correlations among the principal constructs in the model. There is
little or no theoretical basis that suggests a relationship with the principal constructs. The average
correlation among experience of social network site and the principal constructs was r = 0.053 (T
value = 0.902). Finally, we examined the correlation matrix. There was no highly correlated
variable (r > .90), leading to the conclusion that common method bias is not an issue in the both
studies.
4.5.3 PLS Analysis
Partial least square (PLS) was used to assess the measurement model and the hypothesized
structural model in the two studies. The strength of the measurement model was assessed
through examining convergent validity and discriminant validity (Chin 1998; Fornell and
Larcker 1981). To evaluate the explanatory power of the structural model, we assessed the R2 for
each dependent variable. The hypotheses of the research model were tested by conducting
bootstrapping and then assessing the standardized coefficients and t-statistics for the
hypothesized paths in the model.
4.5.3.1 Measurement Model Assessment
Our research model includes all reflective constructs. The measurement model assessment
included an examination of convergent and discriminant validity.
Convergent Validity. We examined standardized loadings. All the loadings were 0.91 or
higher (see Table 6). The standardized loadings are greater than 0.707, suggesting that the shared
variance between each item and its associated construct exceed the error variance (Chin 1998).
Thus, all of the indicators were retained for subsequent analysis.
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Next, the internal consistency for each block of measures by examining Cronbach’s alpha,
composite reliability, and average variance extracted (AVE) were evaluated. Values for
Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability that exceed 0.70 provide adequate evidence of
reliability (Bearden et al. 1993; Yi and Davis 2003). As presented in Table 6, all of the constructs
in the measurement model exhibited Cronbach’s alpha of 0.91 or higher, and composite
reliability of 0.95 or higher. Average variance extracted (AVE) is another indicator of construct
Table 6. Item Loadings and Construct Reliability
Construct
Anticipated Regret
about
Contextualized
Process
Documentation
Anticipated Regret
about Generalized
Process
Documentation
Anticipated Regret
about
No Process
Documentation
Decision to Invest in
Process
Documentation

Item

Standardized
Loading

Cronbach’s
Alpha

Composite
Reliability

Average Variance
Extracted

ARC1
ARC2

0.973
0.974

0.945

0.973

0.948

ARG1
ARG2

0.967
0.968

0.932

0.967

0.936

ARN1
ARN2

0.993
0.993

0.986

0.993

0.986

DEC1
DEC2
DEC3

0.934
0.925
0.910

0.913

0.945

0.852

validity (Fornell and Larcker 1981). All AVEs are 0.85 or higher, indicating above the accepted
threshold of 0.5 (Chin 1998). We concluded that our measures exhibit adequate construct
reliability based on the above analyses.
Discriminant Validity. We examined each indicator’s loading on its own construct and its
cross loading on all other constructs (see Table 7). Table 7 indicates that for each set of measures,
the loadings on the intended construct are higher than the cross loadings on other constructs.
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Table 7. Loadings and Cross-loadings for the Measurement Model
Construct
1. Anticipated Regret
about
Contextualized
Process
Documentation
2. Anticipated Regret
about Generalized
Process
Documentation
3. Anticipated Regret
about No Process
Documentation
4. Decision to Invest
in Process
Documentation

Item

1

2

3

4

ARC1

0.973

-0.173

-0.619

-0.809

ARC2

0.974

-0.154

0.591

-0.793

ARG1

-0.159

0.967

0.141

0.040

ARG2

-0.167

0.968

0.139

0.022

ARN1

-0.634

-0.140

0.993

0.810

ARN2

-0.600

-0.147

0.993

0.791

DEC1

-0.810

0.131

0.798

0.934

DEC2

-0.737

-0.006

0.712

0.925

DEC3

-0.725

-0.049

0.717

0.910

Table 8. AVEs versus Squares of Correlations between Constructs
Construct
Anticipated Regret about
Contextualized Process
Documentation (ARC)
Anticipated Regret about
Generalized Process
Documentation (ARG)
Anticipated Regret about
No Process Documentation
(ARN)
Decision to Invest in Process
Documentation (DEC)

AVE

ARC

ARG

ARN

0.948

-

0.936

0.028

-

0.986

0.386

0.021

-

0.852

0.676

0.001

0.648

DEC

-

Also, we compared the AVE for each construct with the shared variance between all possible
pairs of constructs (Fornell and Larcker 1981). Table 8 presents that AVE for each construct is
higher than the squared correlation between the construct pairs, indicating that more variance is
shared between the latent construct and its block of indicators than with another construct
representing a different block of indicators. Thus, the above analyses offer adequate evidence of
discriminant validity.
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4.5.3.2 Structural Model Assessment
We next examined the structural model (Figure 2). We assessed R2 for each dependent variable
to evaluate the explanatory power of the structural model. The model accounts for 82.0 percent
of the variance in decision to invest in process documentation, 34.1 percent of the variance in
anticipated regret about contextualized process documentation, 17.6 percent of the variance in
anticipated regret about generalized process documentation, and 37.8 percent of the variance in
anticipated regret about no process documentation. These R2 values indicate that overall research
model explained process documentation decision making reasonably well. We used a strong
manipulation for subjects who are currently involved in making process documentation decisions.
Subjects may have guessed the purpose of the manipulation and their expectations may have affected high

R2 (Ome 1979).
We used bootstrapping (1000 resamples) to obtain t values for our path coefficients (see
Figure 2). Because of the directional nature of the hypotheses, one-tailed tests were used.
Requirements uncertainty had a negative effect on anticipated regret about contextualized
process documentation ( = -0.218, p < 0.001), thus supporting H1a. Requirements uncertainty
had a positive effect on anticipated regret about no process documentation ( = 0.370, p < 0.001),
thus supporting H1c. The effect of requirements uncertainty on anticipated regret about
generalized process documentation, however, was not found to be statistically significant. Thus,
H1b was not supported.
Accountability had a negative effect on anticipated regret about contextualized process
documentation ( = -0.366, p < 0.001), thus supporting H2a. Accountability showed a significant
positive relationship with anticipated regret about generalized process documentation, hence
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Figure 2. Structural Model

Control Variables
Requirements
Uncertainty

H1a: -.218
(T=5.534)***
H1b: .048
(NS)
H1c: .370
(T=8.533)***
H2a: -.366
(T=6.725)***

Accountability

H2b: .214
(T=3.222)***

Firm Size, Age, Education
2

R =.341
Anticipated Regret about
Contextualized Process
Documentation
R2 =.176
Anticipated Regret about
Generalized Process
Documentation

H2c: .289
(T=5.964)***
R2 =.378
H3a: .364
(T=7.915)***
H3b: .368
(T=7.257)***
Type of Project
(Traditional vs. Agile)

H4a: -.517
(T=11.350)***
R2 =.820
H4b: .019
(NS)

Decision
to Invest

H4c: .483
(T=11.721)***

Anticipated Regret about
No Process Documentation

H3c: -.366
(T=8.707)***

Note: NS: path coefficient is not significant; Solid lines indicate significant paths and dashed lines indicate nonsignificant paths.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001 (one-tailed test)

supporting H2b ( = 0.214, p < 0.001). Also accountability had a positive effect on anticipated
regret about no process documentation ( = 0.289, p < 0.001), thus supporting H2c.
The type of project had a positive effect on anticipated regret about contextualized process
documentation ( = 0.364, p < 0.001), thus supporting H3a. Type of project showed a significant
positive relationship with anticipated regret about generalized process documentation, thus
supporting H3b ( = 0.368, p < 0.001). It also had a negative effect on anticipated regret about
no process documentation ( = -0.366, p < 0.001), thus supporting H3c.Anticipated regret about
contextualized process documentation also had a significant negative effect on decision to invest
in process documentation ( = -0.517, p < 0.001), thus supporting H4a. Anticipated regret about
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no process documentation had a significant positive effect on decision to invest in process
documentation ( = 0.483, p < 0.001), thus supporting H4c. The effect of anticipated regret about
generalized process documentation on decision to invest in process documentation, however,
was not found to be statistically significant. Thus, H4b was not supported.
4.5.3.3 Control Variables
We did not find any significant relationship between decision to invest in process documentation
and controls variables, that is, firm size ( = -0.012, NS), age ( = 0.023, NS), and education ( =
0.023, NS).
4.6 Discussion
We draw upon regret theory and process documentation literature to investigate how
requirements uncertainty, accountability, and the type of project (traditional vs. agile) influences
anticipated regret about investing in different process documentation options (contextualized,
generalized, or no documentation) and how anticipated regret impact decision to invest in
process documentation.
This study is the first attempt to investigate the following relationships and contributes to the
IS literature in significant ways: first, how requirements uncertainty affects both anticipated
regrets about choosing contextualized process documentation and no process documentation;
second, how accountability influence anticipated regret about the three types of process
documentations; third, how the type of project (traditional or agile) affects anticipated regret
about three different types of process documentations; and finally, how anticipated regret about
contextualized process documentation and no process documentation influence decision to invest
in process documentation. Next we discuss implications for research and practice.
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4.6.1 Implications and Contributions to Theory
4.6.1.1 Literature on IS Process Documentation
This study is one of the first attempts at investigating the role of anticipated regret in the context
of process documentation decision. Based on an empirical support for our model, this study
contributes to this literature in several important ways:
First, understanding the role of anticipated regret in process documentation decision making
is a step in the direction urged by Beaudry and Pinsonneault (2010), who emphasize the need for
studying antecedents and consequences of emotion in the context of IT projects. In this study, we
not only identify the types of anticipated regret involving process documentation decision
making, their antecedent, and their consequence, but also the mechanism by which anticipated
regret is influenced by reference points. A deeper understanding of anticipated regret helps
researchers focus on the potential use of anticipated regret in decision making, the evaluation of
anticipated outcomes of alternatives, and behaviors.
Second, our study is the first to theoretically and empirically establish the linkage between
anticipated regret about creating contextualized and no process documentations and decision to
invest in process documentation. Decision makers who have high anticipated regret about
contextualized process documentation are less likely to make decisions to create contextualized
process documentation. In contrast, those who have high anticipated regret about no process
documentation are more likely to make decision to create either generalized or contextualized
process documentation. People are typically regret-aversive and seek to avoid experiencing
regret (Reb 2008). However, the bright side of experiencing regret, particularly anticipated
regret, is to make people to take vigilant actions for the purpose of minimizing their regret
(Zeelenberg and Pieters 2007). In the IT project contexts, as our results suggest, decision makers
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who experience anticipated regret about a particular process documentation option pursue a
process documentation decision to reduce their anticipated regret.
Third, IS literature (Nidumolu 1995; 1996) has found that requirements uncertainty
influences project performance (e.g., process control, product flexibility). But, how requirements
uncertainty influences process documentation decision in IT projects has not been investigated.
Our findings indicate the significant role of requirements uncertainty that triggers anticipated
regret about creating particular process documentation. Our study is the first to establish this
relationship theoretically and provide an empirical evidence in IT project management field.
We found that under high requirement uncertainty, decision makers tend to experience less
anticipated regret about creating contextualized process documentation, but greater anticipated
regret about no documentation. This suggests that decision makers’ downward or upward
counterfactual thinking on contextualized process documentation or no process documentation
options may lead to less anticipated regret about creating contextualized process documentation,
but greater anticipated regret about no documentation respectively (Hetts et al. 2000; Roese
1997). However, we could not find a significant positive relationship between requirements
uncertainty and anticipated regret about creating generalized process documentation. We
speculate that decision makers tend to focus on the two extreme options for process
documentation and are unable to estimate the anticipated outcomes for generalized process
documentation because what constitutes generalized process documentation may be unclear to
them.
Fourth, through the introduction of accountability, this study seeks to provide an
understanding of the effect of accountability on anticipated regret about creating various process
documentation options. Although psychology literature (Lerner and Tetlock 1999; Quinn and
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Schlenker 2002) has identified accountability as a critical fact that influences emotion and
decision making by improving goal salience, the importance of accountability remains
underdeveloped in the IS field. Our study is the first to theoretically and empirically establish the
relationship between accountability and anticipated regret about creating process documentations
in IT project management contexts.
The effect of accountability was found to be significant in anticipated regret about creating
all three types (contextualized, generalized, and no) of process documentations. The results show
that decision makers who have high accountability tend to experience less anticipated regret
about creating contextualized process documentation but greater anticipated regret about creating
generalized and no process documentations. Consistent with prior literature (Rozelle and Baxter
1981; Tetlock et al. 1989), ‘attention effect’ of accountability may play a role in motivating
decision makers to invest significant efforts on justifying their conducts in creating process
documentations. Our results also support prior study (Passyn and Sujan 2006) in that we found a
significant relationship between high accountability and anticipate regret experienced by
decision makers.
Fifth, our study is also the first to theoretically and empirically establish the relationship
between the type of project (traditional vs. agile) and anticipated regret about creating process
documentations in IT project management contexts. This study reveals a discrepancy between
traditional and agile projects. The results suggest that when compared to traditional projects,
decision makers in agile projects are more likely to experience greater anticipated regret about
creating contextualized and generalized process documentations, but less anticipated regret about
no process documentations. This suggests that in agile projects, decision makers may consider
requirements uncertainty to be so high that the changed requirements may be significantly
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different from the original requirements thereby making process documentation to be of limited
use during maintenance. This leads them to greater anticipated regret about creating
contextualized and generalized process documentations but less anticipated regret about no
process documentation. The results are consistent with the prior studies (Fernandez and
Fernandez 2008; Vinekar et al. 2006) in that decision makes in agile projects are less concerned
about creating documentation than in traditional projects.
Finally, we found a significant negative relationship between anticipated regret about
contextualized process documentation and decision to invest in process documentation and a
significant positive relationship between anticipated regret about no process documentation and
decision to invest in process documentation. Our study is also the first attempt to investigate this
linkage in IT project management field. Consistent with regret theory (e.g., Inman 2007; Reb
2008; Zeelenberg and Pieters 2007), the results of our study also shows the instrumental
behaviors taken by decision makers who experience either anticipated regret about creating
contextualized or no process documentation. The anticipated regret leads the decision makers to
taking vigilant decision making to minimize their future regret by either making a decision not to
create contextualized process documentation or spending more time and efforts to creating
process documentation respectively. However, we did find a significant positive relationship
between anticipated regret about generalized process documentation and decision to invest in
contextualized process documentation. We speculate that the difficulty in estimating the valance
of the outcomes for generalized process documentation and uncertainty about what constitutes
generalized process documentation may lead to this behavior.
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4.6.1.2 Regret Theory
First, prior research has extensively investigated the relationship between responsibility and
regret (e.g., Simonson 1992b; Wong and Kwong 2007; Zeelenberg et al. 2000b). But, a study on
investigating the role of accountability on anticipated regret and decisions is still in infancy.
Thus, this study contributes regret theory by establishing additional evidence on this relationship.
Second, prior studies investigate the role of reference points mostly in post-choice valuation
in multiple option situations (Boles and Messick 1995; Lin et al. 2006a; Tsiros 1998). Although
the literature identifies the potential role of reference points in pre-choice valuation in multiple
option situations (Zeelenberg and van Dijk 1997), we are not aware of any studies that
empirically evaluate this position. We empirically examine the pre-choice valuation of the three
alternatives for creating process documentation.
4.6.2 Implications and Contributions to Practice
The study is likely to help practitioners understand how anticipated regret and regret aversion
tendency influence decision making. Making anticipated regret more salient may enable
practitioners to develop their gut feelings or intuition that can support decision making under
uncertainty. The development of experience repositories that document decision made in prior
project and their outcomes will help project managers develop better evaluate anticipated
outcomes of their decisions when making complex decisions such as process documentation
decisions. The study highlights the importance of using appropriate reference points that support
the valuation of gains and losses (Kahneman 1992). For anticipated regret to occur, the outcomes
of anticipated alternatives can serve as reference point for the comparison of possible alternatives.
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4.6.3 Limitations and Future Research
As is the case with all experiments, we need to be cautious when generalizing the results of this
study for the following reasons. First, although we strive to control extraneous factors through
rigorous experimental process, it is possible that other organizational factors and cognitive
processes may influence emotion and hence the process documentation decision. However, our
methodological approach is consistent with that taken by other researchers who have investigated
the role of regret in decision making (Lankton and Luft 2008; Lin et al. 2006a; Tsiros 1998).
Second, this study will measure self-reported behavioral intentions. It is possible that their
reaction to the treatment scenarios may differ from an actual reaction. Although there may be
some variance between intentions and actual behaviors, findings from the study are likely shed
significant light on the phenomenon. Finally, we will also conduct a follow-up study to see
whether our research model consistently explains process documentation decision making well.
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Appendix 4A: Scenario for the Experiment
You are an IT project manager in your organization. You have just been assigned to manage a
software development project that will use traditional/ plan-driven [agile] software
development methods. The development of the software system is scheduled to commence soon.
Now, you need to decide on the extent to which knowledge about the software development
process should be documented in this project. This documentation is intended to be used
primarily by project personnel who will maintain the software system to ensure that it meets
changing customer needs. You have the following options to choose from in your decision on the
extent of process documentation for this project:

 Extensive / Contextualized process documentation: You will be creating detailed
documentation of all issues that are resolved, the context in which these issues are faced,
alternative solutions considered, assumptions made, the solutions that are adopted, and
the reasons for adopting the chosen solutions.
 Nominal / Generalized process documentation: You will be creating documentation
of only the issues that are resolved and the solutions that are adopted.
 No process documentation
You face several uncertainties while making this decision. If you create nominal or no process
documentation, your project may face expensive rework during maintenance because the
knowledge about the development process may be lost. On the other hand, if you create
extensive documentation, you may find that it was expensive but was found to be unnecessary
during maintenance. Your organization does not have any formal procedures to guide you in
making this decision. Therefore, you need to make your decision based on your intuition or gut
feeling while taking into account the following aspects of the project environment:
a) Based on your prior experience, you believe that the customer requirements identified
during maintenance are likely to be very different [very similar] from those identified
during initial development.
b) Your project will be [will not be] subject to a process audit i.e. you will be
accountable [not accountable] for your decision on the extent of process documentation
created in the project.
If you receive a negative review as a result of a process audit, you will face serious consequences
for your career in the organization which will significantly affect your compensation.
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Appendix 4B: Measurement Items for Constructs

Category
Independent
Variable

Construct
Requirements
uncertainty

Independent
Variable

Accountability

Independent
Variable

Type of Project

Anticipated
Regret about
Contextualized
Process
Documentation

Anticipated
Regret about
Generalized
Process
Documentation

Anticipated
Regret about
No Process
Documentation

Items
*Manipulation check item

*Manipulation check item

*The setting was varied as traditional and agile
software development projects.
When I was evaluating the type of process
documentation that my project team should use, I
thought if I chose detailed (contextualized)
process documentation, and in my project
appraisal if I got a negative review,
(Strongly Disagree/Strongly Agree)(7L)
 I would regret spending excessive time and
effort in creating detailed documentation that
was much more detailed than what was needed
during maintenance.
(Strongly Disagree/Strongly Agree)(7L)
 I would feel sorry for spending excessive time
and effort in creating detailed documentation
that was much more detailed than what was
needed during maintenance.
When I was evaluating the type of process
documentation that my project team should use, I
thought if I chose basic (generalized) process
documentation, and in my project appraisal if I got
a negative review,
(Strongly Disagree/Strongly Agree)(7L)
 I would regret spending only nominal effort
and time in creating documentation that was
much less detailed than what was needed
during maintenance.
(Strongly Disagree/Strongly Agree)(7L)
 I would feel sorry for spending only nominal
effort and time in creating documentation that
was much less detailed than what was needed
during maintenance.
When I was evaluating the type of process
documentation that my project team should use, I
thought if I chose no process documentation, and
in my project appraisal if I got a negative review,
(Strongly Disagree/Strongly Agree)(7L)
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Sources
Informed the
Construct
(Nidumolu 1995;
Nidumolu 1996)
(Lerner and
Tetlock 1999),
(Quinn and
Schlenker 2002),
(Zhang and Mittal
2005)

(Simonson
1992b),
(Zeelenberg et al.
1998b), (Tsiros
and Mittal 2000),
(Wong and
Kwong 2007),
(Lankton and Luft
2008)



Ultimate
Dependent
Variable

Decision to
Invest in
Process
Documentation

Firm Size
Control
Variable

Age
Education

I would regret spending not spending any time
and effort in creating documentation that was
needed during maintenance.
(Strongly Disagree/Strongly Agree)(7L)
 I would feel sorry for spending not spending
any time and effort in creating documentation
that was needed during maintenance.
(No Documentation/Basic (generalized)
Documentation/
Detailed (contextualized) Documentation)(7L)
 What is the extent (level of detail) of process
documentation that you will create for this
project?
(Insignificant Amount of Time/Significant
Amount of Time)(7L)
 In this project, how much time will you spend
in documenting process knowledge?
(Insignificant Amount of Effort/Significant
Amount of Effort)(7L)
 In this project, how much effort will you
spend in documenting process knowledge?
 How many employees does your organization
have?
 What is your age?
(Undergraduate/ Masters/ PHD)
 What is your highest education level?
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(Ungan 2006; Xu
and Ramesh
2008)
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